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Introduction 
After the September 11 attacks, Congress hastily passed the Uniting 
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (“USA PATRIOT Act”),1 
which made several changes to electronic surveillance law.  The Act has 
sparked a fierce debate.2  The pros and cons of the USA PATRIOT Act, 
 Associate Professor, The George Washington University Law School; J.D. Yale Law 
School.  Thanks to Patricia Bellia, Linda Fisher, Chris Hoofnagle, Orin Kerr, Raymond Ku, 
Peter Raven-Hansen, Stephen Saltzburg, Paul Schwartz, and Peter Swire for helpful 
comments on the manuscript.  I would also like to thank Romana Kaleem for excellent 
research assistance. 
 1 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 
115 Stat. 272. 
 2 See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The 
Big Brother That Isn’t, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 607, 637 (2003); Steven A. Osher, Privacy, 
Computers, and the Patriot Act: The Fourth Amendment Isn’t Dead, but No One Will Insure 
It, 54 FLA. L. REV. 521, 542 (2002); Alison A. Bradley, Comment, Extremism in the 
Defense of Liberty?: The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the Significance of the 
USA Patriot Act, 77 TUL. L. REV. 465, 467 (2002); Susan W. Dean, Comment, Government 
Surveillance of Internet Communications: Pen Register and Trap and Trace Law Under the 
Patriot Act, 5 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 97, 98 (2003); Michael F. Dowley, Note, 
Government Surveillance Powers Under the USA Patriot Act: Is It Possible to Protect 
National Security and Privacy at the Same Time? A Constitutional Tug-of-War, 36 SUFFOLK 
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however, are only one part of a much larger issue: How effective is the law 
that regulates electronic surveillance? 
Today, technology has given the government an unprecedented ability 
to engage in surveillance.  New X-ray devices can see through people’s 
clothing, amounting to what some call a “virtual strip-search.”3  Thermal 
sensors can detect movement and activity via heat patterns.4  Telephone 
calls can be wiretapped; places can be “bugged” with hidden recording 
devices; and parabolic microphones can record conversations at long 
distances.5  A device known as Carnivore developed by the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (“FBI”) can scan through all of the e-mail traffic of an 
internet service provider (“ISP”).6  Keystroke logger devices can record 
every keystroke typed on one’s computer,7 and these devices can be 
installed into a person’s computer by e-mailing a computer virus called 
“Magic Lantern.”8  Tracking devices can relay information about a 
person’s whereabouts.9  One can trace cell phone calls to a person’s 
particular location.10 
Surveillance cameras have become ubiquitous.  Britain has erected an 
elaborate system of video cameras which enable officials to monitor city 
U. L. REV. 165, 167 (2002); Jennifer C. Evans, Comment, Hijacking Civil Liberties: The 
USA Patriot Act of 2001, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 933, 934 (2001); David Hardin, Note, The 
Fuss Over Two Small Words: The Unconstitutionality of the USA Patriot Act Amendments 
to FISA Under the Fourth Amendment, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 291, 294 (2003); Nathan C. 
Henderson, Note, The Patriot Act’s Impact on the Government’s Ability to Conduct 
Electronic Surveillance of Ongoing Domestic Communications, 52 DUKE L.J. 179, 180 
(2002); Sharon H. Rackow, Comment, How the USA Patriot Act Will Permit Governmental 
Infringement upon the Privacy of Americans in the Name of ‘Intelligence’ Investigations, 
150 U. PA. L. REV. 1651, 1653 (2002); Anne Uyeda, Note, The USA Patriot Act May 
Infringe on Civil Liberties in Cyberspace, 2002 UCLA J.L. & TECH. NOTES 1, ¶ 4 (2002), at 
http://www.lawtechjournal.com/notes/2002/01_020204_uyeda.php (last visited June 9, 
2004). 
 3 Ivan Amato, Future Tech: Beyond X-ray Vision: Can Big Brother See Right 
Through Your Clothes?, DISCOVER, July 2002, at 24; Guy Gugliotta, Tech Companies See 
Market for Detection; Security Techniques Offer New Precision, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 
2001, at A8. 
 4 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29–30 (2001). 
 5 The opening to the movie The Conversation provides an illustration of the use of 
parabolic microphones.  See THE CONVERSATION (Paramount Studio 1974). 
 6 See generally E. Judson Jennings, Carnivore: U.S. Government Surveillance of 
Internet Transmissions, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 10, § 2 (2001), at 
http://www.vjolt.net/vol6/issue2/v6i2-a10-Jennings.html (last visited June 9, 2004). 
 7 See United States v. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 572, 574 (D.N.J. 2001). 
 8 Ted Bridis, FBI Is Building a “Magic Lantern”; Software Would Allow Agency to 
Monitor Computer Use, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 2001, at A15. 
 9 See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 708 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 460 
U.S. 276, 277 (1983). 
 10 Christine Tatum, Navigators Hit Road in Digital Quest, CHI. TRIB., July 29, 2002, 
§ 4 at 3. 
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streets through closed circuit television.11  Called CCTV, this system has 
grown rapidly ever since it was first used in 1994 in response to terrorist 
bombings.12  By 2001, according to estimates, Britain had one-half million 
surveillance cameras, one for every 120 people.13  The United States has 
begun moving toward the British model.  In 2002, the U.S. National Park 
Service installed surveillance cameras around national monuments in 
Washington, D.C.14 
Surveillance technology can be a useful law enforcement tool, for it 
provides the government with the power to watch people’s activities and 
listen to their conversations.  These profound powers, however, raise 
difficult problems.  As with many countries throughout the world, the 
United States has enacted a series of laws to balance the benefits and 
dangers of surveillance. 
Electronic surveillance law in the United States is comprised primarily 
of two statutory regimes: (1) the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
(“ECPA”),15 which is designed to regulate domestic surveillance; and (2) 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (“FISA”),16 which is 
designed to regulate foreign intelligence gathering.  While other statutes 
provide additional protection, ECPA and FISA are the heart of electronic 
surveillance law. 
The USA PATRIOT Act made a number of changes in electronic 
surveillance law, but the most fundamental problems with the law did not 
begin with the USA PATRIOT Act.  In this Article, I suggest that 
electronic surveillance law suffers from significant problems that predate 
the USA PATRIOT Act.  The USA PATRIOT Act indeed worsened some 
of these problems, but surveillance law had lost its way long before.  
Surveillance law is thus in need of a radical reconstruction; I aim to provide 
some guidance to start this endeavor. 
In Part II, I discuss the purpose and history of electronic law.  In Part 
III, I analyze several problems with existing surveillance law.  I begin by 
focusing on specific difficulties with the scope, standards, and enforcement 
mechanisms of the statutes.  Next, I examine the more deeply rooted and 
 11 See generally CLIVE NORRIS & GARY ARMSTRONG, THE MAXIMUM SURVEILLANCE 
SOCIETY: THE RISE OF CCTV (1999); Jeffrey Rosen, A Cautionary Tale for a New Age of 
Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2001, § 6 (Magazine). 
 12 NORRIS & ARMSTRONG, supra note 11; Rosen, supra note 11, at 41. 
 13 Charles Goldsmith et al., Tuesday’s Attack Forces an Agonizing Decision on 
Americans, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2001, at A8. 
 14 David A. Fahrenthold, Cameras to Oversee Festivities for Fourth, WASH. POST, 
July 3, 2002, at A1; Spencer S. Hsu, D.C. Police Offer Rules for Video Surveillance, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 10, 2002, at B1. 
 15 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 
1848. 
 16 The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 101, 92 
Stat. 1783 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1811 (2000)). 
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systematic problems.  I contend that electronic surveillance law is overly 
intricate and complex, that it has failed to keep pace in adapting to new 
technologies, and that it provides for insufficient judicial and legislative 
oversight.  In Part IV, I suggest ways in which surveillance law should be 
reconstructed to address these problems.  Specifically, I recommend a 
rather radical solution: Warrants supported by probable cause should be 
required for most uses of electronic surveillance.  I explain why this 
solution best resolves the existing problems with electronic surveillance 
law, and I argue that this approach is flexible and practical.  Finally, I 
recommend that Congress draft a charter regulating the FBI. 
I. The Purpose and History of Electronic Surveillance Law 
In order to examine the effectiveness of electronic surveillance law and 
the methods by which to improve it, we must first articulate the goals that 
we want the law to achieve.  At a very general level, the law of electronic 
surveillance recognizes two things: that government surveillance is good 
and that it is bad.  Surveillance is an important law enforcement tool, and it 
can be highly effective at solving and preventing crimes.  Thus, we want 
the government to be able to engage in certain forms of surveillance.  But 
surveillance is also a very dangerous tool, with profound implications for 
our freedom and democracy.  Hence, we also want government 
surveillance to be tightly controlled. 
Our electronic surveillance law was created in response to specific 
problems.  It was thus borne out of experience, and it is designed to redress 
these problems.  In this Part, I discuss the animating problems and concerns 
of surveillance law.  I examine the costs and benefits of electronic 
surveillance as well as the history of how and why surveillance law 
developed the way it did. 
A. Surveillance: The Good and the Bad 
Electronic surveillance is one of the central tools of modern law 
enforcement.  It can aid significantly in the investigations of crimes, for it 
allows the government to watch and listen to people during their unguarded 
moments, when they may speak about their criminal activity.  Video 
cameras may capture criminals in the act and aid in their identification and 
arrest.  Surveillance can also assist in preventing crimes because it enables 
the government to learn about criminal activity that is afoot and to halt it 
before it happens.  Few would argue that these are not significant benefits. 
Surveillance can also prevent crime in another way.  In 1791, Jeremy 
Bentham imagined a new architectural design for a prison which he called 
the Panopticon.17  As Michel Foucault describes it: 
 17 See DAVID LYON, THE ELECTRIC EYE: THE RISE OF THE SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 62 
(1994). 
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[A]t the periphery, an annular building; at the centre, a tower; this 
tower is pierced with wide windows that open onto the inner side 
of the ring; the peripheric building is divided into cells, each of 
which extends the whole width of the building . . . .  All that is 
needed, then, is to place a supervisor in a central tower and to shut 
up in each cell a madman, a patient, a condemned man, a worker 
or a schoolboy.  By the effect of backlighting, one can observe 
from the tower, standing out precisely against the light, the small 
captive shadows in the cells of the periphery.  They are like so 
many cages, so many small theatres, in which each actor is alone, 
perfectly individualized and constantly visible.18 
The Panopticon achieves obedience and discipline by having all 
prisoners believe they could be watched at any moment.  Their fear of 
being watched inhibits transgression.  Surveillance can thus prevent crime 
by making people decide not to engage in it at all.  More generally, 
surveillance is good because it is a highly effective tool for maintaining 
social order.  We want to foster a society where people are secure from 
theft, vandalism, assault, murder, rape, and terrorism.  We thus desire 
social control, and surveillance can help achieve that end. 
But surveillance is bad for the very same reason.  George Orwell’s 
Nineteen Eighty-Four chronicles a totalitarian government called “Big 
Brother” that aims for total social control.19  Everyone is under constant 
fear of being watched or overheard, and everything that people do is rigidly 
controlled by the government.20  In contrast to the society depicted in 
Orwell’s novel, our society aims to be free and democratic, and our 
government is a far cry from Big Brother.  The goal is not to suppress all 
individuality, to force everybody to think and act alike.  Our government, 
however, has some of the same surveillance capabilities as Big Brother.  
And even when the government does not aim for total social control, 
surveillance can still impair freedom and democracy. 
Surveillance has negative side effects that affect both the observed and 
the observers.  For the observed, surveillance can lead to self-censorship 
and inhibition.21  According to Julie Cohen: “Pervasive monitoring of every 
first move or false start will, at the margin, incline choices toward the bland 
and the mainstream.”22  Monitoring constrains the “acceptable spectrum of 
belief and behavior,” and it results in “a subtle yet fundamental shift in the 
 18 MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 200 (Alan 
Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 1st ed. 1979) (1975). 
 19 GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 3 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1992) (1949). 
 20 See id. 
 21 Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
1193, 1260 (1998). 
 22 Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 
52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1426 (2000). 
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content of our character, a blunting and blurring of rough edges and sharp 
lines.”23  Surveillance “threatens not only to chill the expression of 
eccentric individuality, but also, gradually, to dampen the force of our 
aspirations to it.”24  Paul Schwartz argues that surveillance inhibits freedom 
of choice, impinging upon self-determination.25  Surveillance rigidifies 
one’s past; it is a means of creating a trail of information about a person.  
Christopher Slobogin argues that being placed under surveillance impedes 
one’s anonymity, inhibits one’s freedom to associate with others, makes 
one’s behavior less spontaneous, and alters one’s freedom of movement.26  
Surveillance’s inhibitory effects are especially potent when people are 
engaging in political protest or dissent.  People can face persecution, public 
sanction, and blacklisting for their unpopular political beliefs.  Surveillance 
can make associating with disfavored groups and causes all the more 
difficult and precarious. 
For the observers, surveillance presents a profound array of powers 
that are susceptible to abuse.  As Raymond Ku notes, the Framers of the 
Constitution were concerned about “unfettered governmental power and 
discretion.”27  The Framers were deeply opposed to general warrants and 
writs of assistance.28  General warrants “resulted in ‘ransacking’ and 
seizure of the personal papers of political dissidents, authors, and printers 
of seditious libel.”29  Writs of assistance authorized “sweeping searches and 
seizures without any evidentiary basis.”30  As Patrick Henry declared: 
“They may, unless the general government be restrained by a bill of rights, 
or some similar restrictions, go into your cellars and rooms, and search, 
ransack, and measure, every thing you eat, drink, and wear.  They ought to 
be restrained within proper bounds.”31  The problem, in short, is with the 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 
1609, 1656 (1999) (“[P]erfected surveillance of naked thought’s digital expression 
short-circuits the individual’s own process of decisionmaking.”); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy 
and Participation: Personal Information and Public Sector Regulation in the United States, 
80 IOWA L. REV. 553, 560 (1995). 
 26 Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and 
the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 237–67 (2002). 
 27 Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founder’s Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and the 
Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325, 1332 (2002). 
 28 See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 158 (1999); Tracey 
Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment Is Worse than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1, 8 (1994). 
 29 DAVID M. O’BRIEN, PRIVACY, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 38 (1979); see also 
William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 406 
(1995). 
 30 Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as 
Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 82 (1988). 
 31 3 THE DEBATES IN SEVERAL CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
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government having too much power. 
Electronic surveillance presents additional problems.  It is a sweeping 
form of investigatory power.  It extends beyond a search, for it records 
behavior, social interaction, and everything that a person says and does.  
Rather than a targeted query for information, surveillance is often akin to 
casting a giant net, which can ensnare a significant amount of data beyond 
that which was originally sought.  As James Dempsey notes, electronic 
surveillance captures a wide range of communications, “whether they are 
relevant to the investigation or not, raising concerns about compliance with 
the particularity requirement in the Fourth Amendment and posing the risk 
of general searches.”32  Moreover, unlike a typical search, which is often 
performed in a short once-and-done fashion, electronic surveillance 
“continues around-the-clock for days or months.”33  Additionally, in a 
regular search, the government comes to a suspect’s house and often 
searches while the suspect is present; on the other hand, “the usefulness of 
electronic surveillance depends on lack of notice to the suspect.”34  As 
Justice Douglas observed, wiretapping can become “a dragnet, sweeping in 
all conversations within its scope.”35 
Dissenting from Lopez v. United States,36 where the Court upheld the 
use of a pocket wire recorder to record a conversation, Justice Brennan 
observed that surveillance “makes the police omniscient; and police 
omniscience is one of the most effective tools of tyranny.”37  As Justice 
Brandeis observed: 
Whenever a telephone line is tapped, the privacy of the persons at 
both ends of the line is invaded and all conversations between 
them upon any subject, although proper, confidential and 
privileged, may be overheard.  Moreover, the tapping of one 
man’s telephone line involves the tapping of the telephone of 
every other person whom he may call or who may call him.  As a 
means of espionage, writs of assistance and general warrants are 
but puny instruments of tyranny and oppression when compared 
with wire-tapping.38 
Furthermore, information collected by electronic surveillance can 
potentially be abused.  Even if abuses are rare or the risk of abuse is low, 
the existence of legal protection is comforting and freedom-enhancing.  
CONSTITUTION 448–49 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1974). 
 32 James X. Dempsey, Communications Privacy in the Digital Age: Revitalizing the 
Federal Wiretap Laws to Enhance Privacy, 8 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 65, 70 (1997). 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 65 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 36 Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963). 
 37 Id. at 466 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 38 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 475–76 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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People need a degree of control over the government in order to feel free.  
Freedom is not just the absence of restraints; it is a mental state, a felt 
reality in both structure and sentiment.  Like insurance, protections against 
surveillance provide a sense of security. 
Surveillance gives significant power to the watchers.  Part of the harm 
is not simply in being watched, but in the lack of control that people have 
over the watchers.  Surveillance creates the need to worry about the 
judgment of the watchers.  Will our e-mail be misunderstood?  Will our 
confidential information be revealed?  What will be done with the 
information gleaned from surveillance? 
Thus, the goal of surveillance law is to ameliorate these problems 
while at the same time allowing for effective law enforcement.  This can be 
accomplished by providing for the oversight of government surveillance, 
accountability for abuses and errors, and limits against generalized forms of 
surveillance. 
B. The Story of Surveillance Law 
Electronic surveillance emerged as early as the telegraph.  After the 
telegraph was invented in 1844,39 technology to tap into its 
communications was developed shortly thereafter.  Priscilla Regan notes: 
“During the Civil War, the Union and Confederate armies tapped each 
other’s telegraph communications to ascertain battle plans and troop 
movements.  Rival press organizations tapped each other’s wire 
communications in order to be the first to report major news items.”40 
Following the Civil War, Congress attempted to obtain telegraph 
messages maintained by Western Union for various investigations.41  This 
raised quite an outcry.42  Editorials decried the tapping as “an outrage upon 
the liberties of the citizen”;43 as a practice that “outrages every man’s sense 
of his right to the secrets of his own correspondence”;44 and as “hateful and 
repulsive to the people in general.”45  In 1880, Congress considered a bill to 
protect the privacy of telegrams.46  Although the bill was abandoned, state 
law responded.  Several courts quashed subpoenas for telegrams.47  As the 
 39 See ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND CURIOSITY 
FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 123 (2000). 
 40 PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 111 (1995). 
 41 See DAVID J. SEIPP, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 30 (1978); ELLIS 
SMITH, supra note 39, at 69. 
 42 See SEIPP, supra note 41, at 31. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 35. 
 45 Id. at 36. 
 46 Id. at 40. 
 47 Id. 
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Missouri Supreme Court stated in quashing a grand jury subpoena for 
telegrams: “Such an inquisition, if tolerated, would destroy the usefulness 
of this most important and valuable mode of communication.”48  More than 
half of the states passed laws to prohibit the disclosure of telegraph 
messages by telegraph company employees.49 
In the twentieth century, the changing nature of the type of criminal 
activity being prosecuted, the rise of organized police forces, and the 
development of more sophisticated surveillance technologies led to a 
profound increase in law enforcement surveillance.  The rise of the mafia 
and large-scale crime organizations required law enforcement to find 
means to learn about what crimes these groups were planning.  The 
government began to increase prosecution of certain consensual crimes, 
such as gambling, the use of alcohol during Prohibition, and the trafficking 
of drugs.  Unlike robberies or assaults, which are often reported to the 
police, these crimes occurred through transactions in an underground 
market.  Infiltration into this underworld (undercover work), as well as 
surveillance, became key tools to detect these crimes. 
In earlier times, policing consisted of amateurs who merely patrolled 
rather than investigated.50  But by the twentieth century, police forces 
transformed into organized units of professionals.51  The FBI emerged in 
the early years of the twentieth century, the brainchild of Attorney General 
Charles Bonaparte.  In 1907, Bonaparte asked Congress to authorize the 
creation of a detective force in the Department of Justice (“DOJ”).52  At the 
time, the DOJ was borrowing investigators from the Secret Service, and 
Bonaparte wanted a small permanent set of investigators to work for him in 
the DOJ.53  But he was rebuffed by the House Appropriations Committee.54  
Bonaparte again asked Congress in 1908, and members of Congress were 
very skeptical of the idea.55  They worried about the detective force 
becoming a secret police, prying into the privacy of citizens, growing into 
something larger and more unwieldy, and lacking adequate control.56  One 
congressman declared: 
In my reading of history I recall no instance where a government 
perished because of the absence of a secret-service force, but 
many there are that perished as a result of the spy system.  If 
 48 Ex parte Brown, 72 Mo. 83, 95 (1880). 
 49 SEIPP, supra note 41, at 65. 
 50 Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment 
Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1105–06 (2002). 
 51 Id. at 1105; Stuntz, supra note 29, at 435. 
 52 CURT GENTRY, J. EDGAR HOOVER: THE MAN AND THE SECRETS 111 (1991). 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at 111–12. 
 56 Id. at 112. 
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Anglo-Saxon civilization stands for anything, it is for a 
government where the humblest citizen is safeguarded against the 
secret activities of the executive of the government.57 
Congress rejected Bonaparte’s request and even passed a law 
prohibiting the DOJ from borrowing Secret Service agents.58  Before this 
law became effective, however, Bonaparte used the DOJ’s discretionary 
budget to hire Secret Service agents, and he brought in people from other 
parts of the DOJ to form a new subdivision.59  In July 1908, President 
Theodore Roosevelt issued an executive order authorizing the subdivision, 
which became known as the Bureau of Investigation.60  J. Edgar Hoover 
soon took the helm of the Bureau, which was renamed the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (“FBI”) in 1935.61  The FBI grew dramatically throughout 
the rest of the century.  When Franklin Roosevelt became President in 
1933, the FBI had 353 agents and 422 support staff.62  When Roosevelt 
died in 1945, there were 4,380 agents and 7,422 support staff.63 
At the time the FBI was being born, the debate over surveillance of 
communications was entering a new era.  Similar to the story of telegraph 
tapping,64 telephone wiretapping technology arose soon after the invention 
of the telephone in 1876.65  And similar to what occurred earlier with the 
telegraph, the privacy of phone communications became a public concern.  
State legislatures responded by passing laws criminalizing wiretapping.66  
For example, in 1905, California expanded its 1862 law against 
intercepting telegraph messages to include telephone calls.67 
In 1928, in Olmstead v. United States,68 the Supreme Court held that 
the Fourth Amendment did not apply to wiretapping.69  The Court 
reasoned: “There was no searching.  There was no seizure.  The evidence 
was secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only.  There was no 
entry of the houses or offices of the defendants.”70  Justice Brandeis penned 
a powerful dissent, arguing that new technologies required rethinking old-
 57 Id. at 112–13 (quoting Rep. J. Swagar Sherley, D-Ky.). 
 58 Id. at 111, 113. 
 59 GENTRY, supra note 52, at 113; RICHARD GID POWERS, SECRECY AND POWER: THE 
LIFE OF J. EDGAR HOOVER 133 (1987). 
 60 GENTRY, supra note 52, at 113. 
 61 Id. 
 62 RONALD KESSLER, THE BUREAU: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE FBI 57 (2002). 
 63 Id. 
 64 See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text. 
 65 REGAN, supra note 40, at 110–11. Telephone wiretapping began in the 1890s.  
SAMUEL DASH ET AL., THE EAVESDROPPERS 25 (1959). 
 66 ELLIS SMITH, supra note 39, at 157. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
 69 Id. at 469. 
 70 Id. at 464. 
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fashioned notions of the Fourth Amendment: “Subtler and more 
far-reaching means of invading privacy have become available to the 
government.  Discovery and invention have made it possible for the 
government, by means far more effective than stretching upon the rack, to 
obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered in the closet.”71  A year after 
Olmstead, even J. Edgar Hoover testified that “‘while it may not be 
illegal . . . [wiretapping] is unethical and it is not permitted under the 
regulations by the Attorney General.’”72  Hoover declared that “‘any 
employee engaged in wire tapping will be dismissed from the service of the 
bureau.’”73 
In 1934, six years after Olmstead, Congress passed section 605 of the 
Federal Communications Act.74  Under section 605, “no person not being 
authorized by the sender shall intercept any radio communication and 
divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or 
meaning of such intercepted communications to any person.”75  Section 
605, however, was largely ineffective.  It was interpreted only to preclude 
the introduction of wiretapping evidence in court.76  The FBI could thus 
wiretap freely so long as it did not seek to use the evidence at trial.  Section 
605 also did not apply to the states. 
Throughout the middle of the twentieth century, the FBI expanded in 
size and in the scope of its surveillance activities.  World War II and the 
ensuing Cold War enabled the FBI to fortify its powers.77  Presidents 
increasingly gave the FBI new authorization to engage in wiretapping.78  
During World War II, the FBI received a profoundly expanded authority to 
engage in wiretapping and to investigate national security threats.79  
Hoover, who once had promised to fire any FBI employee who 
wiretapped,80 lavishly ordered wiretapping of hundreds of people, including 
 71 Id. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 72 Louis Fisher, Congress and the Fourth Amendment, 21 GA. L. REV. 107, 127 
(1986) (quoting Department of Justice Appropriations Bill for 1931: Hearings Before the 
House Subcomm. on Appropriations, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1930) (testimony of J. Edgar 
Hoover, Director of the Bureau of Investigation)). 
 73 Id. 
 74 Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 47 U.S.C. 
§ 605 (2000)). 
 75 47 U.S.C. § 605. 
 76 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 260 (3d ed. 2000). 
 77 See Americo R. Cinquegrana, The Walls (and Wires) Have Ears: The Background 
and First Ten Years of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 137 U. PA. L. 
REV. 793, 797–98 (1989). 
 78 See WHITFIELD DIFFIE & SUSAN LANDAU, PRIVACY ON THE LINE: THE POLITICS OF 
WIRETAPPING AND ENCRYPTION 155–65 (1998); Cinquegrana, supra note 77, at 797–98. 
 79 See DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 78, at 161–62; William C. Banks & M.E. 
Bowman, Executive Authority for National Security Surveillance, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 26–
27 (2000). 
 80 Fisher, supra note 72, at 127 (citation omitted). 
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political enemies, dissidents, Supreme Court Justices, professors, 
celebrities, writers, and others.81  Among Hoover’s files were dossiers on 
John Steinbeck, Ernest Hemingway, Charlie Chaplin, Marlon Brando, 
Muhammad Ali, Albert Einstein, and numerous presidents and members of 
Congress.82  Justice William Douglas seemed paranoid when he 
complained for years that the Supreme Court was being bugged and 
tapped—but he was right.83  The FBI aggressively investigated political 
dissenters in a program known as COINTELPRO (Counter Intelligence 
Program).84  The program was designed to gather information about 
political groups viewed as domestic security threats.85  The data was used 
to disrupt the lives of the members of these groups, and the FBI’s tactics 
included secretly attempting to convince employers to fire targeted 
individuals, anonymously informing spouses of affairs to break up 
marriages, and trying to induce an IRS investigation to deter individuals 
from attending meetings and events.86  Much of COINTELPRO’s activities 
were focused on the American Communist Party, but the program extended 
to other political groups as well, including members of the Civil Rights 
Movement and opponents of the Vietnam War.87  Included among these 
individuals was Martin Luther King, Jr., whom Hoover had under extensive 
surveillance.88  The FBI surveillance recordings revealed that King was 
having extramarital affairs, and the FBI sent copies of the recordings to 
King and his wife, threatening that if King failed to commit suicide by a 
certain date, the recordings would be released publicly.89 
In the late 1960s, the Court and Congress attempted to rein in the 
growing power of the executive to engage in electronic surveillance.  In 
Berger v. New York, the Court struck down portions of New York’s 
wiretapping statute and outlined the constitutional criteria for electronic 
surveillance.90  In 1967, the Supreme Court reversed Olmstead in United 
States v. Katz, declaring that wiretapping was covered by the Fourth 
 81 KESSLER, supra note 62, at 94, 166, 188. 
 82 Id.  For more information about Hoover’s files on Albert Einstein, see generally 
FRED JEROME, THE EINSTEIN FILE: J. EDGAR HOOVER’S SECRET WAR AGAINST THE WORLD’S 
MOST FAMOUS SCIENTIST (2002). 
 83 GENTRY, supra note 52, at 630. 
 84 POWERS, supra note 59, at 339. 
 85 See 2 Hearings Before the Select Comm. to Study Governmental Operations with 
Respect to Intelligence Activities of the U.S. Senate, 94th Cong. vol.2, at 10 (1976) 
[hereinafter Church Comm. Report]. 
 86 See id. 
 87 DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 6–7 (1999); 
POWERS, supra note 59, at 339, 422–30. 
 88 GENTRY, supra note 52, at 140–42. 
 89 Id. at 126. 
 90 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 44 (1967). 
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Amendment.91 
In 1968, Congress enacted Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act.92  Almost everyone had disliked section 605 of the 
Federal Communications Act.93  Attorney General Nicholas Katzenback 
declared it the “worst of all possible solutions.”94  According to Senate 
Report 1097, section 605 “serves . . . neither the interests of privacy nor of 
law enforcement.”95  The problem with section 605 was that it permitted 
private citizens to wiretap but prohibited law enforcement officials from 
using evidence of electronic surveillance for even the most serious of 
crimes.96  Further, the report stated, “[t]he tremendous scientific and 
technological developments that have taken place in the last century have 
made possible today the widespread use and abuse of electronic 
surveillance techniques.”97  The report also noted the need to permit law 
enforcement to engage in electronic surveillance to combat serious and 
complex crimes performed by “highly organized, structured and formalized 
groups of criminal cartels.”98  Berger and Katz were used “as a guide in 
drafting Title III.”99  Title III extended the reach of electronic surveillance 
law beyond federal officials to state officials and even to private parties.100 
Although Title III was an improvement over section 605, it failed to 
address national security and foreign intelligence surveillance.101  In Katz, a 
debate in dicta arose over whether regular Fourth Amendment procedures 
would apply when national security was at stake.102  In his concurrence, 
Justice White opined that if the president authorized electronic surveillance 
for national security reasons, then the Fourth Amendment should not 
require a warrant.103  Justices Douglas and Brennan, in their own 
concurrence, attacked White’s claim: “There is, so far as I understand 
constitutional history, no distinction under the Fourth Amendment between 
 91 United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 358 (1967). 
 92 Omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 
212 (current version at  18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2520 (2000)). 
 93 JAMES G. CARR & PATRICIA L. BELLIA, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 
§2.1, at 2–3 (2003). 
 94 Hearings on Criminal Laws and Procedures Before a Subcomm. of the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1966) (statement of Nicholas Katzenbach, 
Attorney General, United States). 
 95 S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2154 (1968). 
 96 CARR & BELLIA, supra note 93, § 2.1 at 2–3. 
 97 S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2154. 
 98 Id. at 2157. 
 99 Id. at 2163. 
 100 See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY 
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2003). 
 101 See STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, THE ENEMY WITHIN: INTELLIGENCE GATHERING, LAW 
ENFORCEMENT, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE WAKE OF SEPTEMBER 11, at 37 (2002). 
 102 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 n.23 (1967). 
 103 Id. at 364 (White, J., concurring). 
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types of crimes. . . .  [T]he Fourth Amendment draws no lines between 
various substantive offenses.”104 
In 1972, the Court concluded in United States v. United States District 
Court105 that, under the Fourth Amendment, the government needed a 
warrant to engage in electronic surveillance for domestic criminal 
investigations.106  This case is often referred to as the “Keith case,” named 
after Judge Damon J. Keith, the federal district judge who originally heard 
the matter.  The Court, however, also stated that “domestic security 
surveillance may involve different policy and practical considerations from 
the surveillance of ‘ordinary crime.’”107  The Court reasoned that the 
“gathering of security intelligence” occurs over a long time period and aims 
to prevent future crises.108  Because of these aims, security surveillance 
“may be less precise than that directed against more conventional types of 
crime.”109  Accordingly: 
Different standards [for gathering domestic security intelligence] 
may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment if they are 
reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of Government 
for intelligence information and the protected rights of our 
citizens.  For the warrant application may vary according to the 
governmental interest to be enforced and the nature of citizen 
rights deserving protection.110 
Beyond the “domestic aspects of national security,” the Court explicitly 
declared it was expressing no opinion about surveillance of “foreign 
powers or their agents,” but it noted that warrantless surveillance under 
these limited circumstances “may be constitutional.”111 
Spurred by the Watergate scandal, Congress formed a special eleven-
member committee in 1975 to investigate surveillance abuses over a nearly 
forty-year span from 1936 to 1975.112  The committee was led by Senator 
Frank Church and was called the Church Committee.  Publishing fourteen 
volumes of reports and supporting documents, the Committee concluded 
that the government had engaged in numerous abuses of surveillance, often 
 104 Id. at 360 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 105 United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972). 
 106 Id. at 323–24. 
 107 Id. at 322. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. at 322–23. 
 111 Id. at 321–22 & n.20. 
 112 DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 78, at 178.  Another committee, chaired by Governor 
Nelson Rockefeller, was created in 1975 to investigate CIA surveillance in the United 
States.  The committee report found numerous abuses.  Banks & Bowman, supra note 79, at 
32–33. 
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targeting people solely because of their political beliefs.113  Specifically, the 
Committee noted: 
Too many people have been spied upon by too many Government 
agencies and [too] much information has [been] collected.  The 
Government has often undertaken the secret surveillance of 
citizens on the basis of their political beliefs, even when those 
beliefs posed no threat of violence or illegal acts on behalf of a 
hostile foreign power.114 
Additionally, the Committee reported, every president from Franklin D. 
Roosevelt to Richard M. Nixon improperly used government surveillance 
to obtain information about critics and political opponents.115  The 
Committee counseled for a strict separation between domestic and foreign 
intelligence gathering.116 
FISA117 emerged as a response to the Church Committee reports and to 
the Keith case.  Congress was concerned over surveillance abuses by the 
executive branch, a concern inspired by Nixon’s abuse of surveillance 
powers under the guise of national security.118  As Senate Report 604 
declared: “This legislation is in large measure a response to the revelations 
that warrantless electronic surveillance in the name of national security has 
been seriously abused.”119  The purpose of FISA was to erect a “secure 
framework by which the executive branch could conduct legitimate 
electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes within the context 
of this Nation’s commitment to privacy and individual rights.”120  FISA 
created a distinct regime regulating electronic surveillance for foreign 
intelligence purposes. 
In 1986, Congress amended Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control 
 113 In addition to electronic surveillance, the Church Committee reported on United 
States’s involvement in the assassination of foreign and military leaders as well as foreign 
and military intelligence.  For the reports and documents relating to surveillance abuses 
within the United States, see 1–7 Church Comm. Report, supra note 85.  The Church 
Committee reports are available online at 
http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/church/reports/contents.htm.  The Committee also 
produced a number of additional volumes of reports and documents not cited above.  For 
more background about the Church Committee, see DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 78, at 
178–79; SCHULHOFER, supra note 101, at 60–61; Cinquegrana, supra note 77, at 806–08. 
 114 2 Church Comm. Report, supra note 85, at 5. 
 115 Id. at 9–10. 
 116 DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 78, at 121. 
 117 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 101, 92 Stat. 
1783 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1811 (2000)). 
 118 Robert A. Dawson, Shifting the Balance: The D.C. Circuit and the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1380, 1386 (1993). 
 119 S. REP. NO. 95-604, at 7 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3908. 
 120 Id. at 15, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3916. 
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and Safe Streets Act by passing the ECPA.121  Congress passed ECPA out 
of a concern that new technologies were posing an increasing threat to 
privacy.122  House Report 647 noted that “[l]egal protection against the 
unreasonable use of newer surveillance techniques has not kept pace with 
technology.”123  Additionally, Senate Report 541 mentioned that threats to 
privacy in these new communications media “may unnecessarily 
discourage potential customers from using innovative communications 
systems.”124  ECPA extended Title III to cover a greater range of forms of 
communication, such as e-mail.125  It also extended protection beyond 
communications in transmission to those stored in computer systems.126  
Subsequently, ECPA was amended a number of times, although these 
amendments made relatively minor changes to the structure of ECPA. 
The most substantial changes came after September 11.  In an 
extremely short time following the September 11 attacks, Congress passed 
the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.127  The USA PATRIOT Act’s changes to 
surveillance law, however, were not directly linked to September 11.  
Indeed, when Attorney General John Ashcroft asked the DOJ just a few 
days after September 11 for recommendations on potential changes in 
surveillance law, “the DOJ had already prepared a comprehensive proposal 
for updating the Internet surveillance laws.”128  As Orin Kerr observes, 
many of the changes the DOJ proposed had been introduced in Congress on 
numerous previous occasions and had failed.129  The Act was thus actually 
a DOJ wish list from before September 11. 
The Act made numerous changes to ECPA and FISA.  Among other 
things, the Act created more opportunities for delaying notice of search 
warrants, increased the types of subscriber records that could be obtained 
from communications service providers, and permitted a nationwide scope 
for pen register orders and e-mail search warrants.130  It provided for roving 
wiretaps under FISA as well as increased sharing of foreign intelligence 
information between law enforcement entities.131  The Act made a number 
of other changes as well, which will be discussed later.  Some of these 
 121 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 
1848. 
 122 S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 2–3, 5 (1986); H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 16–19 (1986). 
 123 H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 18. 
 124 S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 5. 
 125 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 16. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 
115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
 128 Kerr, supra note 2, at 637. 
 129 Id. 
 130 See SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 100, at 341–44. 
 131 See id., at 343. 
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changes will sunset on December 31, 2005.132 
II. Electronic Surveillance Law and Its Problems 
The USA PATRIOT Act has been strongly criticized for making 
surveillance law less protective of privacy.  The Act is certainly 
troubling,133 but many of its problems are rooted more deeply in the 
surveillance law that preceded the Act.  The USA PATRIOT Act is 
therefore just the tip of a much larger iceberg.  We thus need to shift the 
focus of the debate from the USA PATRIOT Act to electronic surveillance 
law more generally.  Engaging in this endeavor requires a basic 
understanding of the structure of surveillance law, which primarily consists 
of two statutory frameworks: ECPA and FISA.  Whereas ECPA regulates 
surveillance for domestic purposes (the investigation and prevention of 
crimes), FISA regulates the surveillance of foreign agents within the United 
States.  Since it regulates foreign intelligence gathering, FISA provides a 
much looser set of protections than ECPA.  In this Part, I examine this two-
part regime comprised of ECPA and FISA and assess its problems. 
A. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
Before analyzing the problems with ECPA, it is necessary to discuss 
the basic architecture of the statute.  ECPA restructures Title III into three 
titles.  Title I, known as the Wiretap Act, deals with the interception of 
communications that are in transmission.134  Title II, known as the Stored 
Communications Act, covers the accessing of stored electronic 
communications and records.135 Title III of ECPA, known as the Pen 
Register Act, applies to pen registers and trap and trace devices, which 
record phone numbers or addressing information (such as the “to” and 
“from” lines on e-mail).136 
ECPA covers three types of communications: wire, oral, and 
electronic.  A “wire communication” involves “aural transfer[s],” which are 
communications containing the human voice, that travel through wire at 
 132 USA PATRIOT Act § 224. 
 133 Orin Kerr argues that “[t]he Patriot Act did not expand law enforcement powers 
dramatically, as its critics have alleged.  In fact, the Patriot Act made mostly minor 
amendments to the electronic surveillance laws. . . .  Several of the most controversial 
amendments may actually increase privacy protections, rather than decrease them.”  Kerr, 
supra note 2, at 608.  Kerr goes on to conclude: “The Patriot Act is hardly perfect, but it is 
not the Big Brother law that many have portrayed it to be.”  Id.  Kerr makes a convincing 
case that selected portions of the Patriot Act are not problematic, but there are other parts 
that Kerr does not examine that are quite troubling.  I will discuss some of these parts later. 
 134 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2000). 
 135 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711 (2000). 
 136 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–3127 (2000). 
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some point during their transmission.137  Another type of communication is 
an “oral” one—not to be confused with “aural,” although an oral 
communication by definition must also be “aural.”  This is a 
communication “uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such 
communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying 
such expectation.”138  This definition seemingly applies to communications 
intercepted through bugs or other recording devices that do not involve a 
wire transmission.  So if the police attempted to place a bug in one’s home 
to record one’s dinnertime conversations, this would be an interception of 
an oral communication.  Finally, there are “electronic communications,” 
which are all non-wire and non-oral communications, i.e., signals, images, 
and data, that can be transmitted through a wide range of transmission 
mediums (wire, as well as radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic, etc.).139  
The prime example of an electronic communication is an e-mail message.  
Each of these types of communications—wire, oral, and electronic—is 
protected differently, and sometimes, the same type of communication is 
protected differently in different parts of the statutory regime. 
I will evaluate each part of ECPA—the Wiretap Act, Stored 
Communications Act, and Pen Register Act—by focusing on three main 
topics.  First, I will discuss the scope of each act—the applicability of the 
law to different forms and techniques of surveillance.  Second, I will 
examine the standards required for the government to obtain judicial 
authorization to engage in surveillance.  Third, I will look at the 
enforcement provisions of each act. 
1. The Wiretap Act 
Title I, the Wiretap Act, governs communications intercepted while in 
transmission.  A classic example is a wiretap of a phone conversation.  
Suppose that Jack and Jill are talking on the telephone.  The government 
taps into the line and listens in on the conversation.  Because this occurs 
while the communication is coursing through the telephone wires, it is 
covered by the Wiretap Act. 
a. Scope 
Although the Wiretap Act is quite protective of privacy, it is also very 
limited in scope, and it makes distinctions in types of surveillance that are 
quite puzzling.  For example, silent video surveillance is not covered under 
ECPA.140  Silent video surveillance is not an “aural transfer” because it 
 137 See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1). 
 138 Id. § 2510(2). 
 139 See id. § 2510(12). 
 140 See, e.g., United States v. Falls, 34 F.3d 674, 680 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. 
Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 540 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Biasuci, 786 F.2d 504, 508 
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does not involve a human voice.141  Such surveillance is not covered as an 
electronic communication under the Wiretap Act because it is not 
intercepted in transmission.142  If, however, the government were to 
intercept video images as they were being transmitted over the Internet, this 
would be an interception of an electronic communication under the Wiretap 
Act.143  But this is a communication consisting of video images, not the 
video surveillance of a communication. 
The omission of video surveillance from the Wiretap Act’s scope is 
problematic since silent video surveillance presents similar (and sometimes 
even greater) dangers and threats to privacy as audio surveillance.  As one 
court noted: 
Television surveillance is identical in its indiscriminate character 
to wiretapping and bugging.  It is even more invasive of privacy, 
just as a strip search is more invasive than a pat-down search, but 
it is not more indiscriminate: the microphone is as “dumb” as the 
television camera; both devices pick up anything within their 
electronic reach, however irrelevant to the investigation.144 
As another court observed, “video surveillance can be vastly more intrusive 
[than audio surveillance], as demonstrated by the surveillance in this case 
that recorded a person masturbating before the hidden camera.”145 
An easy way around ECPA’s requirements is thus to install a silent 
video camera rather than a bug.  So long as the camera doesn’t pick up 
audio, all the police need is a skilled lip reader to decipher the 
conversations. 
Ironically, the generally much less stringent protections of FISA cover 
video surveillance.  The government must submit “a detailed description of 
the nature of the information sought and the type of communications or 
activities to be subjected to the surveillance.”146  Moreover, the government 
must certify “that such information cannot reasonably be obtained by 
normal investigative techniques.”147  Foreign agents therefore receive 
protection against silent video surveillance whereas United States citizens 
do not. 
Another limitation in the Wiretap Act’s scope is its narrow definition 
of “interception.”  For the Act to apply, a communication must be 
(2d Cir. 1986). 
 141 See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(18). 
 142 See id. § 2510(1). 
 143 See SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 100, at 333. 
 144 United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 885 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 145 United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433, 1437 (10th Cir. 1990). 
 146 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(6) (2000). 
 147 Id. § 1804(a)(7). 
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intercepted while in transit.148  The government must access it while it is 
actually in the process of traveling to its destination.149  For example, 
suppose Jack calls Jill on the telephone.  The FBI listens in on a wiretap.  
This is clearly covered by the Act.  But suppose Jack e-mails Jill a 
message.  The e-mail travels through the phone wires—just like the 
telephone conversation—although it makes a brief temporary stop at Jill’s 
ISP, where it waits for Jill to download it.  The FBI can access it at the ISP, 
where it is no longer in “flight.”  It is thus not intercepted and the Wiretap 
Act does not apply.  For example, in Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United 
States Secret Service,150 the Secret Service seized a computer at Steve 
Jackson Games, Inc., a company that produced role-playing games.151  The 
computer was used as an e-mail system for 365 users, and it contained 162 
unread e-mail messages.152  Because the e-mail was temporarily sitting on 
this computer, it was not intercepted, and the Wiretap Act did not apply.153 
The Wiretap Act’s narrow definition of “interception” thus does not 
provide much privacy protection for e-mail users.  Unlike a telephone 
conversation, which can only be intercepted while it is actually traveling 
through wires, an e-mail makes a temporary pit stop at the ISP’s server.  
Even though it is still traveling from the sender to the recipient, it does not 
fall within the definition of “interception.”  But this difference seems 
technical.  Phone conversations and e-mail are both very important means 
of communication today, yet phone conversations receive vastly more 
protection. E-mail is quickly becoming one of the central modes of 
communication in the world and is often used in lieu of the telephone.  The 
use of e-mail continues to escalate at a staggering pace.  In 2000, there 
were roughly 505 million e-mail accounts, and the number is expected to 
reach 1.2 billion by 2005.154  According to projections, by 2005, over 36 
billion e-mails will be sent each day throughout the world.155  Despite these 
profound statistics, ECPA treats e-mail like a second-class citizen. 
Another problem with the narrow definition of “interception” is 
demonstrated in United States v. Scarfo,156 where the FBI used a device 
known as a “Key Logger System,” which recorded the defendant’s 
keystrokes on his computer to figure out his password.157  Scarfo argued 
 148 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2000). 
 149 Id. 
 150 Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 151 Id. at 458–59. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. at 461–62. 
 154 Cindy M. Rice, The TCPA: A Justification for the Prohibition of Spam in 2002, 3 
N.C. J.L. & TECH. 375, 376 (2002). 
 155 Id. 
 156 United States v. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 572 (D.N.J. 2001). 
 157 Id. at 574. 
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that the keystroke logger was akin to a wiretap and therefore the Wiretap 
Act applied.158  According to the court, however, there was no interception 
because the key logger did not record keystrokes while Scarfo’s modem 
was operating.159  Thus, the keystrokes were not intercepted in transit.160  
Indeed, the FBI deliberately programmed the key logger system to stop 
recording once the modem started transmitting.161  This seems like an end 
run around ECPA based on a technicality.  For example, suppose a person 
drafts a letter and then e-mails it to another person.  Rather than waiting for 
the letter to be sent and then intercepting it then, the FBI could simply 
capture the keystrokes before the letter is sent, thus escaping from the 
protections of the Wiretap Act. 
b. Standards 
The Wiretap Act requires the government to meet very high standards 
in order to obtain authorization to intercept communications.  A court order 
under the Act provides more protection than an ordinary Fourth 
Amendment search warrant, and Orin Kerr refers to it as a “‘super’ search 
warrant.”162  The Wiretap Act only permits certain types of high ranking 
officials to apply for the warrant.163  In addition to requiring probable 
cause, a super warrant requires a specific description of where the 
communication will be intercepted, the type of communication,  and the 
duration of the interception.164  The court order must make sure that the 
interception of nonrelevant communications is minimized and that the 
surveillance immediately “terminate upon attainment of the authorized 
objective.”165  In contrast to a Fourth Amendment warrant, which only lasts 
for a short time, however, a Wiretap Act court order can authorize 
surveillance for up to thirty days.166  Moreover, although the standards for 
authorization are fairly high, they have limited impact because of the 
Wiretap Act’s narrow scope. 
c. Enforcement 
Generally, enforcement under the Wiretap Act is quite strong.  The 
Wiretap Act provides for high civil penalties—minimum damages of 
$10,000 per violation.167  Additionally, wire and oral communications are 
 158 Id. at 581. 
 159 Id. at 581–82. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Kerr, supra note 2, at 621. 
 163 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2000). 
 164 Id. § 2518. 
 165 Id. § 2518(5). 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. § 2520(c)(2)(B). 
SURVEILLANCE-FINAL.DOC 9/30/2004  9:03 PM 
1722 The George Washington Law Review [Vol. 72:1701 
 
protected with an exclusionary rule,168 but electronic communications are 
not.169  At trial, the result is that a defendant can suppress evidence 
obtained by the illegal interception of a phone conversation but not an e-
mail.  Since e-mail has become a central mode of communication, this 
discrepancy is baseless. 
2. The Stored Communications Act 
The Stored Communications Act (Title II) regulates communications 
in “electronic storage.”170  The Stored Communications Act also governs 
law enforcement access to subscriber records of various communications 
service providers, such as ISPs.171  Therefore, if a communication is being 
transmitted from its origin to a destination, the Wiretap Act applies; if it is 
stored electronically in a computer, the Stored Communications Act 
governs.  As discussed later, the Stored Communications Act is much less 
protective than the Wiretap Act. 
a. Scope 
“Electronic storage” is defined as “any temporary, intermediate 
storage” that is “incidental” to the communication and “any storage of such 
communication by an electronic communications service for purpose of 
backup protection of such communication.”172  This definition significantly 
limits the scope of the Stored Communications Act.  For example, e-mail 
sitting on the ISP’s server waiting to be downloaded is in “electronic 
storage.”  After people download and read their messages, however, they 
often retain copies of them on the ISP’s server.  For example, I keep many 
old e-mail messages in my law school e-mail account’s inbox.  I also keep 
copies of the messages I send to others in the outbox.  Because these 
messages are now stored indefinitely, according to the DOJ’s interpretation 
(which was drafted by Orin Kerr), the e-mail is no longer in temporary 
storage and is “simply a remotely stored file.”173  Therefore, under this 
view, it falls outside of much of the Act’s protections.174  Since many 
people store their e-mail messages after reading them and the e-mail they 
send out, this enables the government to access their communications with 
very minimal limitations. 
The Stored Communications Act also regulates the government’s 
 168 Id. § 2518 (10)(a). 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. § 2510(17). 
 171 Id. § 2510(17)(B). 
 172 Id. § 2510(17). 
 173 COMPUTER CRIME AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SECTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
MANUAL ON SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN 
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS § III.B (2001) [hereinafter DOJ MANUAL]. 
 174 But see Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075–76 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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access to customer records maintained by a service provider.  The Stored 
Communications Act lists certain customer record information that is 
protected less stringently than stored communications: the customer’s 
name, address, phone numbers, billing records, and types of services the 
customer utilized.175  The USA PATRIOT Act expanded the list to include 
“records of session times and durations,” “any temporarily assigned 
network address,” and “any credit card or bank account number” used for 
payment.176 
b. Standards 
The Stored Communications Act is much less protective than the 
Wiretap Act.  Whereas the Wiretap Act requires a “super warrant,”177 the 
Stored Communications Act requires a range of less restrictive orders.  
Regular warrants are required only to obtain the contents of 
communications in electronic storage for 180 days or less.178  If 
communications are stored over 180 days, the government can access them 
with an administrative subpoena, a grand jury subpoena, a trial subpoena, 
or a court order.179  There is no requirement for probable cause, only 
“specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds” 
to believe communications are “relevant” to the criminal investigation.180  
For remotely stored files, such as e-mails that have been downloaded and 
read, the DOJ contends that the government can access them with a mere 
subpoena,181 a radically different device than a warrant.  Subpoenas do not 
require probable cause or judicial approval.182  As William Stuntz notes, 
federal subpoena power is “akin to a blank check.”183 
The government can obtain customer record information by providing 
“specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that . . . the records or other information sought, are relevant and 
 175 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(C). 
 176 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 
§210, 115 Stat. 272 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2)). 
 177 18 U.S.C. § 2518; see also Kerr, supra note 2, at 621. 
 178 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a). 
 179 Id. § 2703(b). 
 180 Id. § 2703(d).  If the government does not want to provide prior notice to the 
subscriber that it is seeking the information, it must obtain a warrant.  Id. § 2703(b).  In a 
number of circumstances, however, notice can be delayed for up to three months after 
information has been obtained.  Id. § 2705. 
 181 DOJ MANUAL, supra note 173, § III.D.1.  The government must provide prior or 
delayed notice to the individual.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(B)(i)–(b)(2). 
 182 Fisher, supra note 72, at 152. 
 183 William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth 
Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 864 (2001). 
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material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”184  ISP records are quite 
important because they contain key information that can identify people 
using screen names or pseudonyms on the Internet.  Thus, a person’s First 
Amendment right to speak anonymously is implicated.  As the Court has 
noted, “identification and fear of reprisal might deter perfectly peaceful 
discussions of public matters of importance.”185  Accordingly, when private 
parties have sought to obtain the identities of anonymous speakers, courts 
have required heightened standards for subpoenas.186  Unfortunately, the 
Stored Communications Act fails to acknowledge that ISP records 
implicate important constitutional rights.  It allows the government to 
obtain records by merely demonstrating relevance to an ongoing criminal 
investigation.  As previously discussed, this standard does not rise to the 
level of probable cause.  The ease of government access to ISP records 
creates a host of problems that I have examined elsewhere.187  For the 
purposes of this discussion, it suffices to say that the Stored 
Communications Act goes astray in assuming that ISP records are not 
important enough to deserve greater protection. 
c. Enforcement 
The Stored Communications Act is enforced with much less stringent 
penalties than the Wiretap Act.  Whereas Wiretap Act violations have 
minimum damages of $10,000, Stored Communications Act violations 
carry minimum damages of only $1000.188  Another major problem with 
the Stored Communications Act is that it lacks an exclusionary rule.  Even 
if the police violate the Act blatantly, they can still use surveillance 
evidence obtained from such misconduct against a defendant in a criminal 
trial.  For example, in United States v. Hambrick,189 the police used an 
obviously invalid subpoena to obtain ISP records about a pseudonymous 
person.190  In United States v. Kennedy,191 the court found that a court order 
to obtain the defendant’s ISP records was deficient because the government 
failed to articulate the “specific and articulable facts” required to justify the 
order.192  Nevertheless, the evidence was admitted in the trial because the 
Stored Communications Act has no exclusionary rule.193 
 184 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). 
 185 Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960). 
 186 See, e.g., Doe v. 2TheMart.com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1095 (W.D. Wash. 
2001); Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999). 
 187 See generally Solove, supra note 50. 
 188 18 U.S.C. § 2701(b). 
 189 United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504 (W.D. Va. 1999). 
 190 Id. at 505–06. 
 191 United States v. Kennedy, 81 F.Supp. 2d 1103 (D. Kan. 2000). 
 192 Id. at 1109–10. 
 193 Id. at 1106; Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 510. 
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Orin Kerr contends that the lack of an exclusionary rule is quite 
problematic because the exclusionary rule is a very effective enforcement 
device, and without it, “criminal defendants have little incentive to raise 
challenges to the government’s Internet surveillance practices.”194  Kerr 
notes that when defendants complain about a Stored Communications Act 
violation, “the courts generally reject [the defendant’s complaint] without 
reaching the merits on the ground that no suppression remedy exists.”195  
Due to the lack of an exclusionary rule, violations of the Stored 
Communications Act do not receive adequate attention in the courts. 
3. The Pen Register Act 
The Pen Register Act (Title III of ECPA) regulates the government’s 
use of pen registers and trap and trace devices.  In Smith v. Maryland,196 the 
Court held that pen registers are not protected by the Fourth Amendment.197  
A pen register is a device that records the numbers of one’s outgoing phone 
calls.198  It produces information akin to that on a phone bill—a list of all 
the numbers a person called, and the date, time, and duration of each call.199  
A trap and trace device records the numbers of one’s incoming phone 
calls.200  In Smith, the Court reasoned that a person has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in this information because the telephone company 
has access to it.201  Further, the Court noted, “a pen register differs 
significantly from the listening device employed in Katz, for pen registers 
do not acquire the contents of communications.”202  Therefore, pen 
registers and trap and trace devices receive no Fourth Amendment 
protection at all.203 
The Pen Register Act provides some protection of privacy, although, 
as I discuss below, the protection is very weak.  Under the Act, the 
government must obtain a court order to use a pen register or trap and trace 
device.204 
a. Scope 
ECPA largely tracks the distinction made by the Court in Smith v. 
 194 Orin S. Kerr, Lifting the “Fog” of Internet Surveillance: How a Suppression 
Remedy Would Change Computer Crime Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 824 (2003). 
 195 Id. 
 196 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 197 Id. at 745–46. 
 198 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2000); Smith, 442 U.S. at 736 n.1. 
 199 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 736 n.1. 
 200 18 U.S.C. § 3127(4). 
 201 Smith, 442 U.S. at 742–43. 
 202 Id. at 741. 
 203 Id. at 745–46. 
 204 18 U.S.C. § 3121(a). 
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Maryland, between what Kerr calls “envelope” and “content” 
information.205  Analogizing to postal mail, Kerr states that “the content 
information is the letter itself, stored safely inside its envelope.  The 
envelope information is the information derived from the outside of the 
envelope, including the mailing and return addresses, the stamp and 
postmark, and the size and weight of the envelope when sealed.”206  Kerr 
notes that Congress “has shown little interest in protecting mere envelope 
information” but has “regulated prospective content information very 
strictly.”207  Accordingly, only content is regulated under the Wiretap Act 
and Stored Communications Act.  Envelope information is governed by the 
Pen Register Act’s less stringent protections. 
This distinction works fine for mail, but it is dubious even in Smith 
with pen registers.  As Justice Stewart observed in dissent: “The numbers 
dialed from a private telephone—although certainly more prosaic than the 
conversation itself—are not without ‘content.’. . .  [These numbers] easily 
could reveal the identities of the persons and the places called, and thus 
reveal the most intimate details of a person’s life.”208  As Justice Marshall 
stated in his dissent: 
Many individuals, including members of unpopular political 
organizations or journalists with confidential sources, may 
legitimately wish to avoid disclosure of their personal contacts.  
Permitting governmental access to telephone records on less than 
probable cause may thus impede certain forms of political 
affiliation and journalistic endeavor that are the hallmark of a truly 
free society.209 
As Kerr observes, pen register information can reveal a lot.210  A lengthy 
call will suggest that “the two people on opposite ends of the line knew 
each other, or at least had something substantial to discuss.”211  It reveals 
“activity from within the suspects’ homes that tells the police where they 
were, at what time, and how long they spoke.”212 
The USA PATRIOT Act expanded the definition of pen registers and 
trap and trace devices to apply to addressing information on e-mails (e-mail 
headers) and to Internet Protocol (“IP”) addresses.213  Previously, pen 
 205 Kerr, supra note 2, at 611–16. 
 206 Id. at 611. 
 207 Id. at 630. 
 208 Smith,  442 U.S. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 209 Id. at 751 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 210 Kerr, supra note 2, at 643. 
 211 See id. 
 212 Id. 
 213 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 
§216, 115 Stat. 272, 288-290 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3)–(4) (2000)). 
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registers were defined as devices that recorded “the numbers dialed . . . on 
the telephone line.”214  Now, the definition extends to all “dialing, routing, 
addressing, or signaling information” beyond telephone lines to numerous 
forms of transmission.215  The effect of this change is that e-mail headers 
(the addressing information on e-mail messages), IP addresses, and 
Uniform Resource Locators (“URLs”) fall under this definition. 
When applied to IP addresses and URLs, the envelope/content 
distinction becomes even more fuzzy.  An IP address is a unique number 
that is assigned to each computer connected to the Internet.  Each website, 
therefore, has an IP address.  On the surface, a list of IP addresses is simply 
a list of numbers; but it is actually much more.  With a complete listing of 
IP addresses, the government can learn quite a lot about a person because it 
can trace how that person surfs the Internet.  The government can learn the 
names of stores at which a person shops, the political organizations a 
person finds interesting, a person’s sexual fetishes and fantasies, her health 
concerns, and so on. 
Perhaps even more revealing are URLs.  A URL is a pointer—it points 
to the location of particular information on the Internet.  In other words, it 
indicates where something is located.  When we cite to something on the 
Web, we are citing to its URL.  For example, the following is the URL to 
Orin Kerr’s webpage: 
http://www.law.gwu.edu/faculty/profile.asp?ID=3568. 
One can visit Kerr’s webpage by typing the above URL into one’s web 
browser and clicking the “Go” button.  Therefore, URLs can reveal the 
specific information that people are viewing on the Web.  URLs can also 
contain search terms.  So if one does a search on Google for Orin Kerr, she 
will be directed to a URL that reads: 
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-
8&q=orin+kerr.  Note that the URL reveals her search: “orin+kerr.”  As 
Kerr notes, “[w]hether URLs that include search terms and other 
websurfing addresses can contain ‘contents’ presents a surprisingly 
difficult question.”216  The question is difficult because the 
envelope/content distinction is not always clear.  In many circumstances, to 
adapt Marshall McLuhan, the “envelope” is the “content.”217  Envelope 
information can reveal a lot about a person’s private activities, sometimes 
as much (and even more) than can content information.  Yet, as discussed 
below, envelope information receives very little protection in contrast to 
content information.218 
 214 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2000). 
 215 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 216. 
 216 Kerr, supra note 2, at 645. 
 217 I am referring to McLuhan’s famous phrase, “the medium is the message.” 
MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN 7 (1964). 
 218 See infra Part II.A.3.b. 
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Kerr, however, argues that envelope information should receive lesser 
privacy protection because it “is quite rare for noncontent information to 
yield the equivalent of content information.”219  Kerr contends that the 
example of Internet search terms in URLs is “misleading,” since “Internet 
search terms very well may be contents.”220  Kerr, however, overlooks the 
great difficulty in making the envelope/content distinction.  Kerr assumes 
that a compilation of envelope information is generally less revealing than 
content information.  However, a person may care more about protecting 
the identities of people with whom she communicates than the content of 
those communications.  Indeed, the identities of the people one 
communicates with implicates freedom of association under the First 
Amendment.  The difficulty is that the distinction between content and 
envelope information does not correlate well to the distinction between 
sensitive and innocuous information.  Envelope information can be quite 
sensitive; content information can be quite innocuous.  Admittedly, in 
many cases, people do not care very much about maintaining privacy over 
the identities of their friends and associates.  But it is also true that in many 
cases, the contents of communications are not very revealing.  Many e-
mails are short messages which do not reveal any deep secrets, and even 
Kerr would agree that this should not lessen their protection under the law.  
This is because content information has the potential to be quite sensitive—
but this is also the case with envelope information. 
b. Standards 
The Pen Register Act does not provide much in the way of protection 
for envelope information.  The standard to obtain a pen register order is 
remarkably low.  All the government needs to do is certify that “the 
information likely to be obtained by such installation and use is relevant to 
an ongoing investigation.”221  Courts do not even review the evidence to 
back up the government’s claim.  The court must take the government’s 
word without question.  One court has even called the judicial role 
“ministerial in nature.”222  Orders can last up to 60 days.223 
Moreover, there are no particularization or minimization 
requirements.224  The Act does not specify the nature of the investigation.225  
 219 Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a 
Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. __, manuscript 49 n.86 
(2004). 
 220 Id. at manuscript 50 n.86. 
 221 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a) (2000). 
 222 United States v. Fregoso, 60 F.3d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1995); see also DOJ 
MANUAL, supra note 173, § IV.B. 
 223 18 U.S.C. § 3123(c). 
 224 See id. § 3123(b). 
 225 See id. § 3122. 
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The investigation could be a large scale dragnet or COINTELPRO, but it 
does not matter.  Furthermore, the use of the pen register must only be 
“relevant” to an investigation.226  It is hard to imagine how the government 
could fail to make this showing regardless of how illegitimate its desired 
use of the pen register might be.  In fact, Kerr agrees that the pen register 
provision is not protective enough and argues for a “higher threshold to 
obtain the court order” and “judicial review of the government’s 
application.”227  Kerr also notes, however, that because the Pen Register 
Act provides protection where the Fourth Amendment provides none, it is 
“primarily a privacy law.”228  Title II is thus actually increasing the 
protection, because without Title II, these records could be entirely 
unprotected.  This is certainly true, but giving limited and ineffective 
protection is not necessarily improving the situation in a meaningful way.  
Instead, it assigns a legislative stamp of legitimacy on the government’s 
obtaining such information.  It also gives an illusory judicial stamp of 
legitimacy by providing for court orders without even minimal judicial 
supervisory power. 
c. Enforcement 
As with the Stored Communications Act, the Pen Register Act does 
not contain an exclusionary rule.  Thus, like the Stored Communications 
Act, the Pen Register Act does not provide recourse to defendants on whom 
the government has illegally collected information. 
B. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
FISA creates a different regime for surveillance to obtain “foreign 
intelligence” information than the ECPA regime that governs regular 
government surveillance.229  The regime created by FISA is designed 
primarily for intelligence gathering agencies to regulate how they gain 
general intelligence about foreign powers within the borders of the United 
States.  FISA is very permissive; it provides for expansive surveillance 
powers with little judicial supervision.  FISA permits electronic surveillance 
and covert searches pursuant to court orders, which are reviewed by a 
special court of eleven federal district court judges known as the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”).230  The court meets in secret, 
 226 Id. § 3122(b)(2). 
 227 Kerr, supra note 2, at 639.  Kerr suggests “specific and articulable facts” as the 
threshold, but this is only one step above the existing standard.  Id.  In contrast, I believe 
that a warrant should be required. 
 228 Id. at 638. 
 229 For a more thorough background about the FISA, see Peter P. Swire, The 
System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ___ (2004). 
 230 Originally, there were seven judges on the court, but the USA PATRIOT Act raised 
the number to eleven.  See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
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with the government presenting applications for orders ex parte.231  If the 
government receives an adverse decision, it can appeal to a three-judge 
panel.232 
FISA’s protections against surveillance are much looser than those of 
the ECPA.  Under the ECPA and the Fourth Amendment, surveillance is 
only authorized if there is a showing of probable cause that the surveillance 
will uncover evidence of criminal activity; under FISA, however, orders 
are granted if there is probable cause to believe that the monitored party is 
a “foreign power” or “an agent of a foreign power.”233  Unlike the ECPA, 
FISA surveillance is therefore not tied to any required showing of a 
connection to a criminal investigation.  FISA does not have this safeguard 
since it is about gathering general intelligence about other countries and 
their activities within the United States.  FISA orders can last for ninety 
days234 as opposed to thirty days for an ECPA order.235 
The problem with FISA is its secrecy.  Of course, monitoring foreign 
agents on United States soil is difficult without secrecy.  But as William 
Banks and M.E. Bowman observe, “[t]he secrecy that attends FISC 
proceedings, and the limitations imposed on judicial review of FISA 
surveillance, may insulate unconstitutional surveillance from any effective 
sanction.”236  Under FISA, the entire proceedings are held ex parte, with 
nobody permitted to argue the opposing side.237  Only the government has 
the opportunity to appeal.238  The government thus gets two bites at the 
apple, and the courts only hear the government’s side. 
This procedure is problematic because there is little to ensure against 
abuses of power.  Compounding this problem is the fact that FISA 
intelligence can be used in domestic criminal trials.239  Ordinarily, in a 
domestic criminal trial, surveillance evidence must be obtained through the 
procedures of ECPA.  But if information is obtained under the less 
stringent FISA provisions, it can still be used for the prosecution of 
domestic crimes. 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. 
L. No. 107-56, § 208, 115 Stat. 272, 283 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (2000)).  For more 
details about the workings of the FISC, see generally Benjamin Wittes, Inside America’s 
Most Secretive Court, 143 N.J. L.J. 777 (1996). 
 231 50 U.S.C. § 1093(a) (2000). 
 232 Id. § 1803(b). 
 233 Id. § 1805(a). 
 234 Id. § 1805(e). 
 235 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5). 
 236 Banks & Bowman, supra note 79, at 87; see also Nola K. Breglio, Note, Leaving 
FISA Behind: The Need to Return to Warrantless Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 113 
Yale L.J. 179, 188 (2003). 
 237 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a). 
 238 See 18 U.S.C. § 1803(b). 
 239 See SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 100, (manuscript at 341). 
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Because FISA surveillance power is much broader and more loosely 
regulated than the ECPA, what prevents the government from using it in 
lieu of ECPA to prosecute regular crimes?  The bulwark against such uses 
is FISA’s limited applicability, for FISA applies only when the government 
aims to gather foreign intelligence, not when the government is 
investigating a domestic crime. 
The USA PATRIOT Act, however, expanded FISA’s applicability.  
Previously, FISA applied only when “the purpose” of the investigation was 
to gather foreign intelligence; the USA PATRIOT Act enlarged FISA’s 
scope to apply when foreign intelligence gathering was “a significant 
purpose” of the investigation.240  This seemingly subtle change has 
potentially dramatic ramifications.  By changing the language from “the 
purpose” to “a significant purpose,” foreign intelligence gathering no 
longer needs to be the primary purpose of the surveillance.241  The 
government can now rely on loose FISA protections even when foreign 
intelligence gathering is only one of many goals. 
In light of this change, Ashcroft altered the minimization procedures of 
FISA.  FISA requires that when conducting foreign intelligence gathering, 
the government must implement procedures to minimize the gathering of 
information about United States citizens.242  These procedures prevent the 
broad powers of FISA from being used for ordinary domestic criminal 
investigations.  In one type of minimization procedure, investigators 
establish an “information screening wall,” in which officials not involved 
in the criminal investigation review FISA surveillance and pass along only 
information that will be relevant to the criminal investigation.  In 2002, 
Ashcroft revised the minimization procedures, virtually eliminating the 
screening walls.  The FISC reviewed these procedures and rejected them.243  
According to the court, the “2002 procedures appear to be designed to 
amend the law and substitute the FISA for Title III electronic 
surveillance.”244  But the three-judge FISA review court reversed.245  In the 
first case ever appealed from the FISC, the review court declared that by 
changing FISA by using the words “a significant purpose,” the USA 
PATRIOT Act “eliminated any justification for the FISC to balance the 
relative weight the government places on criminal prosecution as compared 
 240 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 
204, 115 Stat. 272 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (2000)). 
 241 Id. (emphasis added). 
 242 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(1) (2000). 
 243 In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. 
Supp. 2d 611, 625 (Foreign Intell. Surv. Ct. 2002). 
 244 Id. at 623. 
 245 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 720 (Foreign Intell. Surv. Ct. 2002). 
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to other counterintelligence responses.”246  Therefore, if the government 
“articulates a broader objective than criminal prosecution—such as 
stopping an ongoing conspiracy—and includes other potential non-
prosecutorial responses, the government meets the statutory test.”247  Only 
if the “government’s sole objective [is] merely to gain evidence of past 
criminal conduct . . . the application should be denied.”248 
This ruling underscores the problematic nature of the USA PATRIOT 
Act’s amendments to FISA.  Government investigations can have a large 
scope and multiple purposes.  Especially in cases involving terrorism, the 
line between foreign intelligence gathering and domestic law enforcement 
is often blurred.  Since FISA surveillance information can be used in 
domestic criminal trials, FISA increasingly can become a tool for domestic 
law enforcement and an end run around the protections of ECPA.249  
Expanding the scope of FISA makes it more likely that government will 
use the FISA regime to conduct widespread surveillance with very scant 
legal protections. 
C. The Overarching Problems 
The problems discussed above consist of gaps, lapses in protection, 
inadequate standards for obtaining authorization to engage in surveillance, 
and weak enforcement devices.  Some contend that electronic surveillance 
law will work quite effectively if its glitches are repaired.  Orin Kerr, for 
example, gives the Stored Communications Act a grade of “B” and 
suggests a few modifications to the statute.250  While some problems with 
could be patched, this would merely be a temporary fix because electronic 
surveillance law has some larger, more overarching difficulties.  There are 
three general problems that should be addressed in order to reach a more 
long-lasting and far-reaching solution: (1) surveillance law is overly 
complex and confusing; (2) it fails to quickly respond and adapt to new 
technology; and (3) it fails to provide sufficient oversight of the executive 
branch from both the judicial and legislative branches. 
 246 Id. at 735. 
 247 Id. 
 248 Id. 
 249 The USA PATRIOT Act’s expansion of FISA brings into question Kerr’s assertion 
that the Act is not much of a Big Brother law.  Kerr, supra note 2, at 608.  Kerr focuses on 
only a few specific parts of the USA PATRIOT Act that are not as problematic as some 
critics contend; the fact that some provisions are nonproblematic cannot counterbalance the 
rather dangerous change in FISA—indeed, Kerr even concedes in a footnote that “some 
provisions of the Patriot Act may prove to have serious negative consequences for privacy 
and civil liberties.”  Id. at 625 n.75.  Kerr mentions the FISA changes as “particularly 
notable in this regard.”  Id.  Unfortunately, these provisions are notable enough to refute 
Kerr’s general conclusion that the Patriot Act is relatively benign. 
  See Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act—And a 250
Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ___, manuscript 85 (2004). 
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1. Rocket Science 
A central problem with surveillance law is its profound complexity.  
When reprinted in Marc Rotenberg’s Privacy Law Sourcebook, in a normal 
font and page size, the ECPA weighs in at fifty-seven pages.251  The FISA 
extends for more than forty pages.252  There are a myriad of different terms 
with complicated definitions.  The statute zigzags with dozens of cross-
references.  As cataloged by Orin Kerr, it contains at least seven different 
legal threshold requirements for government surveillance, including 
subpoenas, different types of court orders, and different kinds of 
warrants.253 
ECPA also provides different protections depending upon how the 
government accesses a particular communication.  The Wiretap Act covers 
communications intercepted in transmission.  The Stored Communications 
Act provides different protection for communications accessed in computer 
storage.  Communications are also protected differently depending upon 
how long they are stored.  Accessing the customer records of a 
communications service presents another set of rules.  Yet another group of 
rules governs the accessing of routing information about a communication.  
And so on. 
Kerr, who can probably recite the ECPA by memory, and perhaps even 
in verse, admits that it is “surprisingly difficult to understand.”254  Kerr 
notes that “courts, legislators, and even legal scholars have had a very hard 
time understanding the method behind the madness of the [Stored 
Communications Act of ECPA].”255  He states that the “law of electronic 
surveillance is famously complex, if not entirely impenetrable.”256  In 
numerous articles, Kerr has elucidated the complexities of the law, giving 
us countless charts and tables.  But alas, all the exegesis Kerr can produce 
will only help us so much.  The intricacy of electronic surveillance law is 
remarkable because it is supposed to apply not just to the FBI, but to state 
and local police—and even to private citizens.  Given its complexity, 
however, it is unfair to expect these varying groups to comprehend what 
they can and cannot do.  Indeed, even courts have struggled with 
understanding the statute.  Courts have described surveillance law as 
caught up in a “fog,”257 “convoluted,”258 “fraught with trip wires,”259 and 
 251 MARC ROTENBERG, PRIVACY LAW SOURCEBOOK 162–219 (2002). 
 252 Id. at  88–128. 
 253 See Kerr, supra note 2, at 620–21. 
 254 Kerr, supra note 250, at manuscript 1. 
 255 Id. at manuscript 2. 
 256 Kerr, supra note 194, at 820. 
 257 Briggs v. Am. Air Filter, 630 F.2d 414, 415 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 258 United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 259 Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1543 (5th Cir. 1994). 
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“confusing and uncertain.”260  If one is not willing to study ECPA like a 
biblical scholar studies the Bible, there is little hope of figuring out ECPA. 
2. Difficulty in Adapting to New Technology 
Electronic surveillance law has not kept pace with the staggering 
growth of technology.  As discussed earlier, the law currently makes 
antiquated distinctions that often do not protect what is most important.  
Electronic surveillance law has lagged behind technological developments 
and has not been responsive to new surveillance technologies. 
Despite the development of the Internet, e-mail, and the dizzying array 
of other twentieth century technologies, there have only been five major 
attempts at shaping electronic surveillance law—in 1934 with section 605 
of the Federal Communications Act,261 in 1968 with Title III of the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act,262 in 1978 with FISA,263 in 
1986 with ECPA,264 and in 2001 with the USA PATRIOT Act.265  While 
ECPA has been amended between 1986 and 2001, Kerr notes that these 
“subsequent changes have merely nibbled around the edges of the law.”266  
Thus, major revisions to the law occur in fifteen to forty year intervals.  
Even with foresight, the law is bound to be lagging behind technological 
developments, especially given the profound specificity and detail of the 
current statutory regime. 
The most notable problem in this regard is the law’s failure to keep 
pace with the breathtaking development of the Internet.  In 1989, less than 
90,000 computers were connected to the Internet.267  The number increased 
to one million by 1993 and to over nine million by 1996.268  According to 
projections, there will be over 720 million Internet users by 2005.269 
 260 Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, 302 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 261 Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 47 U.S.C. 
§ 605 (2000)). 
 262 Omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 
212 (current version at  18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2520 (2000)). 
 263 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 101, 92 Stat. 
1783 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1811 (2000)). 
 264 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 
1848 (1986). 
 265 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 
115 Stat. 272. 
 266 Kerr, supra note 194, at 814. 
 267 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996) 
 268 Id.; see also Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: 
Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925, 
930 (2001). 
 269 See Louis U. Gasparini, The Internet and Personal Jurisdiction: Traditional 
Jurisprudence for the Twenty-First Century Under the New York CPLR, 12 ALB. L.J. SCI. & 
TECH. 191, 194 (2001). 
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Despite these dramatic changes since the passage of ECPA in 1986, 
Congress has failed to engage in a major revision of the law.  Under this 
state of affairs, law enforcement cleverly employs new technologies to try 
to avoid triggering ECPA.270  Often, these technologies are quite invasive, 
but the debate seems to turn on technicalities—whether the surveillance fits 
into ECPA’s framework.  This invites a technological rat race, in which 
law enforcement uses new technologies designed to fit within ECPA’s less 
stringent provisions or to fall entirely outside of ECPA’s scope. 
Moreover, new surveillance technologies are often used before 
Congress has had a chance to study them, as was the case with Carnivore.  
In 2000, the Wall Street Journal reported that since 1999, the FBI had been 
using Carnivore, a device installed on ISP servers to intercept e-mail and 
instant messaging information.271  The FBI contends that Carnivore is akin 
to a pen register, but critics charge that it actually has some features that 
resemble wiretaps.272  Regardless of who is right on this issue, an important 
concern has been neglected—the FBI had been using this new device 
before it had been fully studied and debated. 
In another example, the Key Logger System, as examined in United 
States v. Scarfo,273 was used before being critically examined.  The Key 
Logger System was a device the FBI developed that could be secretly 
installed into one’s computer to log all of a person’s keystrokes.274  News 
reports disclosed that the FBI had also developed a second keystroke 
logging device called “Magic Lantern” that could be sent surreptitiously 
into a person’s computer like a computer virus.275  Even though Carnivore, 
the Key Logger System, and Magic Lantern were developed with electronic 
surveillance law in mind, this is not enough.  Just because these devices 
may fit within the law does not mean that they do not pose new dangers.  
Even if such devices fit within the law technically, it is not clear that they 
correspond with the law’s spirit.  Lost amid the labyrinthian task of 
applying ECPA’s complex provisions is the question of whether new 
technologies contravene the appropriate balance between effective law 
enforcement and privacy. 
Currently, the focus is on following the dictates of a law developed 
before the rise of the Internet and e-mail rather than ensuring that the law 
responds to advancements in technology and provides effective law 
enforcement tools without stifling individual privacy.  Although Congress 
has updated ECPA on numerous occasions, it has done so in relatively 
 270 See supra notes 157–161. 
 271 Neil King, Jr. & Ted Bridis, FBI’s Wiretaps to Scan E-Mail Spark Concern, WALL 
ST. J., July 11, 2000, at A3. 
 272 Id. 
 273 United States v. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 572 (D.N.J. 2001). 
 274 Id. at 574. 
 275 Bridis, supra note 8. 
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minor ways and has failed to address many difficult questions. 
Moreover, the FBI has been developing and using new surveillance 
technologies without discussing them publicly.  As one FBI spokesperson 
said: “It’s completely inappropriate [to discuss new surveillance 
technologies].  Why would we?  That would defeat the whole purpose of 
surveillance.”276  But as Raymond Ku aptly observes, the public should 
play a role in determining the scope of the executive branch’s power.277  
Unfortunately, Ku notes, the use of surveillance technology is often “left 
entirely to the discretion of law enforcement.”278  In a self-governing 
democracy, it is hard to justify the secret deployment and use of 
surveillance technology on United States citizens without affording 
adequate public discussion about the costs and benefits of these new 
technologies.  Electronic surveillance law does not adequately ensure for 
such discussion by the people directly or through their representatives in 
Congress. 
3. Inadequate Judicial and Legislative Oversight 
Under many parts of electronic surveillance law, there is insufficient 
legislative and judicial oversight.  Congress loosely engages in oversight of 
law enforcement surveillance, only occasionally becoming directly 
involved.  For example, when Congress learned about Carnivore, it held 
hearings to discuss the pros and cons of the device.279  Another example is 
the Department of Defense’s Total Information Awareness (“TIA”) 
program, run by John Poindexter, which, in 2002, aimed to gather 
extensive information about American citizens for use in profiling for 
terrorists.280  The media strongly criticized the program.  William Safire 
wrote a vociferous editorial in the New York Times charging that 
Poindexter “is determined to break down the wall between commercial 
snooping and secret government intrusion. . . .  [H]e has been given a $200 
million budget to create computer dossiers on 300 million Americans.”281  
In January 2003, the Senate added an amendment to a spending bill to deny 
funding for TIA until the Department submitted a report about the program 
for Congress to study.282  Subsequently, the Senate prohibited funding for 
the program in another bill.283  Only in cases that receive significant media 
 276 Sean Marciniak, Web Privacy Services Complicate Feds’ Job, WALL ST. J., July 3, 
2003, at B4. 
 277 Ku, supra note 27, at 1357. 
 278 Id. at 1358. 
 279 See SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 100, at 365. 
 280 William Safire, You Are a Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2002, at A35. 
 281 Id. 
 282 See Cheryl Bolen, Senate Withholds Data-Mining Funds Until DOD Addresses 
Privacy, Rights Issues, Privacy L. Watch (BNA) (Jan. 27, 2003). 
 283 See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE 
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attention will Congress become involved.  Indeed, although Congress 
curtailed TIA, similar data-mining endeavors continue to take place 
because they have received less publicity.284 
Oversight is also lacking in the reporting system for electronic 
surveillance.  The Wiretap Act requires the government to submit reports 
about wiretapping activity to the Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts, which are then transmitted to Congress.285  No such reports are 
required under the Stored Communications Act.  Moreover, as Charles 
Kennedy and Peter Swire point out, there is little congressional supervision 
over state wiretaps.286  The majority of approved wiretap applications are at 
the state rather than the federal level, and only half of the states report 
statistics about their wiretap orders.287  As a result, Congress often does not 
learn about new surveillance technologies until after they are deployed. 
Many surveillance technologies remain unstudied and without judicial 
supervision.  The FBI is largely under the supervision of the executive 
branch; but unlike federal agencies, the FBI does not have enabling 
legislation that establishes its jurisdiction and powers.  Therefore, oversight 
often is turned over to the judicial branch.  Unfortunately, electronic 
surveillance law has very lax standards that often do not give the judiciary 
sufficient involvement or ability to circumscribe the use of surveillance. 
Moreover, electronic surveillance law does not provide for enough 
oversight of the FBI by the judicial and legislative branches.  Unlike other 
government agencies, such as the Food and Drug Administration and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, the FBI does not have enabling 
legislation that defines its powers and jurisdiction.  Instead, many of the 
FBI’s surveillance practices are governed by guidelines established by the 
Attorney General.  In 1976, in response to the growing awareness about the 
FBI’s checkered history of abuses, Attorney General Edward Levi crafted 
guidelines for the FBI to safeguard against surveillance that could affect 
First Amendment activities.288  The Levi Guidelines provided specific 
limits on the types of investigative activities in which the FBI could 
engage.289  FBI agents could use undercover agents, engage in surveillance 
of political activities, and undertake other invasive investigative techniques 
INFORMATION AGE (forthcoming 2004). 
 284 See id. 
 285 18 U.S.C. § 2519 (2000). 
 286 Charles H. Kennedy & Peter P. Swire, State Wiretaps and Electronic Surveillance 
After September 11, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 971, 972 (2003). 
 287 See id. at 972–73. 
 288 See Banks & Bowman, supra note 79, at 68–69.  The Guidelines were called 
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL DOMESTIC SECURITY INVESTIGATION GUIDELINES 
(1976).  FBI Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of 
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 521–60 (1976) [hereinafter Levi Guidelines]. 
 289 See Banks & Bowman, supra note 79, at 68–69. 
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only if pursuant to “investigation” authorized under the guidelines.290  
Investigations could be initiated when FBI agents had “specific and 
articulable facts” creating a reason to believe that a person was involved in 
violent activities in order to conduct an investigation.291 
Under subsequent presidential administrations, these guidelines have 
been made less restrictive.292  In 1983, Attorney General William French 
Smith revised the Levi Guidelines.293  The Smith Guidelines lowered the 
threshold standard for initiating an investigation to “when the facts or 
circumstances reasonably indicate that two or more persons are engaged in 
an enterprise for the purpose of furthering political or social goals wholly 
or in part through activities that involve force or violence and a violation of 
the criminal laws of the United States.”294  Thus, the threshold changed 
from the standard of “specific and articulable facts” to the looser standard 
of “reasonable indication.”  The Smith Guidelines stated that the 
“reasonable indication” standard is “substantially lower than probable 
cause,” and that it “does not require specific facts or circumstances 
indicating a past, current, or impending violation.  There must be an 
objective, factual basis for initiating the investigation; a mere hunch is 
insufficient.”295  In 1989, Attorney General Dick Thornburgh revised the 
guidelines again, although the changes were minor.296 
In 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft made profound changes to 
the guidelines.  Under both the Levi and Smith Guidelines, the FBI was 
restricted from monitoring public events and gathering information about 
people’s First Amendment activities unless it was related to an 
investigation.  As discussed above, the Smith Guidelines lowered the 
standard to initiate an investigation, but there was still a threshold before 
the FBI could begin to engage in these activities.  Ashcroft’s revised 
guidelines allow the FBI to gather information and mine the Internet for 
data without any requirement that it relate to criminal activity.297  
 290 Levi Guidelines, supra note 288, at 22. 
 291 Id. 
 292 See Banks & Bowman, supra note 79, at 69–70; David M. Park, Note, Re-
Examining the Attorney General’s Guidelines for FBI Investigations of Domestic Groups, 
39 ARIZ. L. REV. 769, 772–73 (1997); Mitchell S. Rubin, Note, The FBI and Dissidents: A 
First Amendment Analysis of Attorney General Smith’s 1983 FBI Guidelines on Domestic 
Security Investigations, 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 453, 454–55 (1985).  For more background about 
the guidelines, see generally John T. Elliff, The Attorney General’s Guidelines for FBI 
Investigations, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 785 (1984). 
 293 See THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIMES, RACKETEERING 
ENTERPRISE AND DOMESTIC SECURITY/TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS  (1983). 
 294 Id. § III.B.1.a. 
 295 Id. § II.C.1. 
 296 See THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIMES, RACKETEERING 
ENTERPRISE AND DOMESTIC SECURITY/TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS § II.C.1 (1989), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/generalcrimea.htm (last visited June 5, 2004). 
 297 See THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIMES, RACKETEERING 
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Accordingly, the FBI can collect any “publicly available information” and 
can “carry out general topical research, including conducting online 
searches and accessing online sites and forums.”298  These new guidelines 
apply not just to terrorism, but to federal crimes in general.299 
Despite the significance of these changes, it is unclear what, if 
anything, electronic surveillance law has to say about them.  These changes 
took place through executive fiat rather than through legislative discussion 
or debate.  They were not subjected to any checks by the judicial or 
legislative branches. 
By and large the responsibility for keeping government surveillance 
under control has been delegated to the judiciary.  Unfortunately, in many 
instances, electronic surveillance law provides very weak standards for the 
judiciary to authorize the surveillance.  As discussed above, many 
provisions in the Stored Communications Act and Pen Register Act fall 
dramatically short of requiring probable cause, individualized suspicion, or 
minimization procedures.  At times, the judicial role appears to be little 
more than a rubber stamp.300  With such a limited role, problems with 
government surveillance applications can go undetected.  The FISA court 
in its only published opinion of May 17, 2002, noted that the government 
had admitted it erred in about seventy-five FISA applications, which 
included making false statements about the nature of the investigation and 
the sharing of the information.301  Had the government not admitted the 
errors, it is unlikely that they would ever have been discovered. 
In sum, electronic surveillance law has not established an adequate 
system of checks and balances on executive power.  Congress updates the 
law from time to time, and occasionally becomes involved, but often, the 
law is left to drift.  Congress needs to play a greater role in monitoring the 
executive branch, and electronic surveillance law must afford the judiciary 
with more meaningful oversight. 
ENTERPRISE AND TERRORISM ENTERPRISE INVESTIGATIONS § VI  (2002), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/generalcrimes2.pdf (last visited June 5, 2004).  For more 
information about data mining and the Ashcroft Guidelines, see Solove, supra note 50, at 
1096–97. 
 298 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIMES, RACKETEERING 
ENTERPRISE AND TERRORISM ENTERPRISE INVESTIGATIONS , supra note 297, § VI.B.1. 
 299 SCHULHOFER, supra note 101, at 58. 
 300 As Paul Schwartz notes, electronic surveillance orders are rarely denied.  Between 
1968 and 1996, judges rejected only twenty-eight applications for surveillance orders out of 
20,000.  See Paul M. Schwartz, German and U.S. Telecommunications Privacy Law: Legal 
Regulation of Domestic Law Enforcement Surveillance, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 751, 793–94 
(2003). 
 301 See In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 
F. Supp. 2d 611, 620 (Foreign Intell. Surv. Ct. 2002). 
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III. Reconstruction 
Many of the problems with electronic surveillance law stem from its 
rigid, Byzantine structure, which makes a myriad of distinctions that 
quickly become antiquated as technology evolves.  The result is that the 
law ends up with lapses in protection.  The degree of protection against 
certain forms of surveillance often does not turn on how problematic or 
invasive it is, but on the technicalities of how the surveillance fits into the 
law’s structure.  In this Part, I suggest two solutions.  First, I propose a 
broad rule that warrants should be required for most instances of electronic 
surveillance.  Second, I contend that Congress should enact a legislative 
charter to regulate the FBI.  Both solutions I recommend are designed to 
maintain a better system of checks and balances by giving the judicial and 
legislative branches a greater role in monitoring and constraining the 
surveillance activities of the executive branch.  As the Church Committee 
noted, “The overwhelming number of excesses continuing over a 
prolonged period of time were due in large measure to the fact that the 
system of checks and balances—created in our Constitution to limit abuse 
of Governmental power—was seldom applied to the intelligence 
community.”302  Presidents, Attorneys General, and other high-ranking 
executive officials have historically provided “broad mandates” and 
“vague” guidance to intelligence agencies that led to “excessive or 
improper intelligence activity.”303  Electronic surveillance law thus must be 
reconstructed to increase legislative and judicial oversight. 
A. A Warrant Rule for Electronic Surveillance 
We need a surveillance law that is flexible enough to respond to 
emerging technologies.  A better approach would be more sweeping.304  I 
contend that for most uses of electronic surveillance, warrants supported by 
probable cause should be required.305  This should be the general rule, with 
specific exceptions authorizing access under less strict standards 
enumerated in the statute.  This approach has the virtue of simplicity.  
Additionally, all violations should be enforced by an exclusionary rule.  
Warrants under the law could have a duration of thirty days, as often 
electronic surveillance must take place over a longer time period than a 
regular search or seizure. 
 302 2 Church Comm. Report, supra note 85, at 14. 
 303 Id. 
 304 I will not discuss the rules to govern surveillance by private parties.  These rules 
may need to be different, as the dangers and harms resulting from private party surveillance 
are not identical to those of government surveillance. 
 305 My approach attempts to shift the defaults in a somewhat similar way to how 
Raymond Ku suggests that Fourth Amendment analysis be altered.  He argues that Congress 
should authorize the government’s use of technology by statute for it to be considered 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  Ku, supra note 27, at 1374–75. 
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Critics of warrants might point out that they are cumbersome because 
probable cause is a higher standard than the existing standards under much 
of federal surveillance law.  Warrants, however, serve several important 
functions.  First, they are an effective way of checking the power of law 
enforcement entities and of circumscribing the government’s investigation 
power.306  As discussed in Part II, the central problems of surveillance are 
that it will chill individual freedom and political activity, and that it can 
lead to excessive exercises of executive power.  James Madison captured 
the heart of the problem when he wrote: 
But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on 
human nature?  If men were angels, no government would be 
necessary.  If angels were to govern men, neither external nor 
internal controuls on government would be necessary.  In framing 
a government which is to be administered by men over men, the 
great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the government 
to controul the governed; and in the next place, oblige it to 
controul itself.307 
In other words, Madison’s concern can be captured with the famous 
question: Who will watch the watchers?  Madison’s solution was to 
separate the power of the government into different branches so they could 
check each other.308 
Warrants force law enforcement officials to justify their exercises of 
power.309  As Justice Douglas explained for the Court: 
We are not dealing with formalities.  The presence of a search 
warrant serves a high function.  Absent some grave emergency, 
the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the 
citizen and the police.  This was done not to shield criminals nor 
to make the home a safe haven for illegal activities.  It was done 
so that an objective mind might weigh the need to invade that 
privacy in order to enforce the law.310 
Second, warrants protect against sweeping dragnet investigations.  The 
Fourth Amendment’s requirement that the government demonstrate that 
there be individualized suspicion protects against the risk that innocent 
people will be searched.  It also prevents the government from engaging in 
“fishing expeditions.”311  This is why a warrant must describe with 
 306 Solove, supra note 50, at 1127. 
 307 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 308 Id. 
 309 Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 
1, 17 (1991). 
 310 McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948). 
 311 Fisher, supra note 72, at 115 (“The spirit and letter of the fourth amendment 
counselled against the belief that Congress intended to authorize a ‘fishing expedition’ into 
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“particular[ity] . . . the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.”312 
Third, warrants prevent hindsight bias because they require the courts 
to balance privacy and law enforcement needs prior to the search.313  This 
prevents the results of the search from tainting the court’s decision. 
Some might claim that warrants are ineffective because judges 
frequently grant warrant applications.  Christopher Slobogin argues, 
however, that warrants raise the “standard of care” of law enforcement 
officials, forcing them to “document their requests for authorization.”314  
Warrants thus force law enforcement officials to be certain that a search is 
really necessary.  The high rate of granting warrants may be a reflection of 
warrants doing their job efficiently by having law enforcement officials 
avoid making overreaching requests to search in the first place. 
What makes warrants such an effective compromise is that they do not 
constitute an absolute bar to the activities of law enforcement.  Warrants 
merely ensure that law enforcement officials focus on particular individuals 
and that they are given adequate independent oversight. 
Of course, there will need to be exceptions from this general rule.  
Specific electronic devices that do not pose difficulties (such as regular 
cameras) should be exempted from this requirement.  Another exception 
could apply if a communication is made directly to a government agent.  
Certain voluntary disclosures of communications to the government could 
also be exempted.  Thus, if a person receives an e-mail from Osama Bin 
Laden by mistake, she can forward it on to the government.  Other 
exceptions will also need to be made. 
The key difference in this approach is that it refocuses the debate.  The 
discussion will be over the specific instances where warrants are too 
cumbersome, rather than over technicalities.  As technology continues to 
develop, the burden should be on law enforcement officials to convince 
Congress that a new device does not threaten individual privacy and that 
they should be authorized to use it with less than a warrant.  The problem 
with the current law is that the FBI can try out new technologies in secret.  
Unless these technologies are reported to the public, which sometimes 
sparks an outcry, then there will be little pressure on Congress to 
investigate them and determine whether to enact protections.  If the burden 
is placed on law enforcement to lobby Congress to use new technology, 
this would allow necessary debate and discussion about the costs and 
benefits of these technologies to occur. 
What makes this simple approach preferable is that it is more 
private papers on the possibility that they may disclose a crime.”). 
 312 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 313 Solove, supra note 50, at 1127. 
 314 Slobogin, supra note 309, at 17. 
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adaptable to changing technology than the highly technical provisions of 
much of current wiretap law.  It allows law enforcement to engage in 
surveillance while keeping it circumscribed and accountable. 
One might object that warrants are not feasible to achieve the purposes 
of electronic surveillance, especially in cases of national security.  The 
Keith Court noted that “domestic security surveillance may involve 
different policy and practical considerations from the surveillance of 
‘ordinary crime.’”315  In particular, national security surveillance is often 
not aimed at finding out about who perpetrated past crimes; it is often 
prospective, designed to glean information about future threats.  Keith 
suggested that the traditional Fourth Amendment warrant and probable 
cause requirements might not be compatible with the aims of such 
surveillance and that “[d]ifferent standards” may be constitutional if they 
are “reasonable.”316  This language in Keith suggests one of two 
alternatives to my proposal for warrants.  First, one could generally support 
my approach but carve out an exception for cases involving national 
security, where less stringent requirements than warrants and probable 
cause would be required.  Second, one could contend more broadly that 
warrants should not be required for electronic surveillance and that a 
standard of “reasonableness” should suffice. 
Regarding an exception for national security, such a rule could 
threaten to practically eviscerate most protection against electronic 
surveillance.  “National security” has often been abused as a justification 
not only for surveillance, but also for maintaining the secrecy of 
government records as well as violating the civil liberties of citizens.  The 
Japanese Internment, as well as many of the abuses chronicled by the 
Church Committee, were justified in the name of national security.317  As 
the court noted in United States v. Ehrlichman,318 the Watergate burglary 
was an example of the misuse of “national security” powers: “The danger 
of leaving delicate decisions of propriety and probable cause to those 
actually assigned to ferret out ‘national security’ information is patent, and 
is indeed illustrated by the intrusion undertaken in this case . . . .”319  The 
government has often raised national security concerns to conceal 
embarrassing and scandalous documents from the public—documents 
which often turned out to be harmless, such as the Pentagon Papers.320  
 315 United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 322 (1972). 
 316 Id. at 322–23. 
 317 DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 78, at 121. 
 318 United States v. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
 319 Id. at 926. 
 320 See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); A CULTURE OF 
SECRECY: THE GOVERNMENT VERSUS THE PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO KNOW (Athan G. Theoharis 
ed., 1998).  Attorney General John Mitchell wrote to the New York Times, stating that the 
Pentagon Papers “‘will cause irreparable injury to the defense interests of the United 
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Beyond abusive invocations of national security, the line between national 
security and regular criminal activities is very blurry, especially in an age 
of terrorism.  What precisely is “national security”?  Is a mass murderer on 
the loose a national security issue?  Some have even argued that drug 
trafficking is a national security issue.321  Justice Brennan aptly observed 
that “the concept of military necessity is seductively broad, and has a 
dangerous plasticity.”322  Because of these problems, a national security 
exception to the warrant requirement should not be made. 
An even broader approach is to apply a “reasonableness” standard in 
lieu of the warrant requirement.  Akhil Amar argues that the Fourth 
Amendment has long been misinterpreted to require the use of warrants 
supported by probable cause for searches and seizures.323  Reasonableness, 
Amar contends, is what the Fourth Amendment requires.324  Setting aside 
the question of whether this is the correct interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment, should electronic surveillance law adopt a reasonableness 
standard as a policy matter?325  I submit that the answer should be an 
emphatic “no.”  The standard of “reasonableness” is a rather toothless one.  
For administrative, school, and employment searches, the Court has held 
that the Fourth Amendment merely requires that a search be 
“reasonable.”326  In a vast majority of applications of this standard—from 
searching employee offices and files, searching a student’s purse at school, 
testing student athletes for drugs, and testing all students engaged in 
extracurricular activities for drugs—the Court has concluded that the search 
was reasonable.327  Since the reasonableness standard has proven to be 
States.’”  STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 1017 (3d ed. 2002) (quoting 
Attorney General John Mitchell).  The Pentagon Papers revealed that the government had 
misled the public about the origin of United States involvement in Vietnam.  See id. at 1013. 
 321 DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 78, at 78 (discussing the trend of classifying the drug 
war as a national security issue). 
 322 Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 369 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 323 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 31 (1997). 
 324 Id.  I have critiqued Amar’s views more extensively elsewhere.  See Solove, supra 
note 50, at 1124–28. 
 325 In an interesting proposal regarding the FISA, Nola Breglio recommends that FISA 
orders be issued not by the secret FISC, but by regular Article III courts.  See Breglio, supra 
note 236.  Additionally, Breglio contends that the standard for foreign intelligence 
surveillance should be one of “reasonableness,” which should be determined post hoc, after 
the surveillance has taken place.  See id. at 211–14.  In addition to the problems with the 
reasonableness standard discussed below, a post hoc review will suffer from extreme 
hindsight bias. 
 326 According to the doctrine, warrantless searches and seizures without probable cause 
do not violate the Fourth Amendment if “special needs, beyond the normal need for law 
enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.”  Griffin v. 
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (citations omitted). 
 327 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 838 (2002) (drug testing of all 
students engaged in extracurricular activities was “reasonable”); Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. 
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995) (drug testing of student athletes was “reasonable”); 
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quite weak in practice, it will not afford sufficient protection against the use 
of electronic surveillance. 
The warrant and probable cause requirements are not incompatible 
with surveillance designed to detect prospective threats.  Probable cause 
exists “where the facts and circumstances within [law enforcement 
officials’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy 
information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable 
caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.”328  
Such a requirement would prohibit surveillance based upon mere 
conjecture, naked suspicion, race or nationality, religious affiliation, or 
political speech.  It would not, however, require that the government 
investigate only previously completed crimes.  The planning of future 
crimes, especially terrorism, is itself a crime, most likely conspiracy or 
attempt.  Therefore, the government could obtain a warrant to engage in 
electronic surveillance if it had “reasonably trustworthy information” that a 
future crime was being discussed between conspirators or being planned.  
The warrant rule would prevent dragnet surveillance designed to listen in 
broadly on people’s conversations—most likely people from disfavored 
groups—in the hope of hearing some suspicious chatter. 
The approach I recommend does not apply to the FISA.  The FISA, as 
it was originally conceived before being altered by the USA PATRIOT 
Act, aimed to allow for foreign intelligence gathering, which is different 
from criminal investigations.  Foreign intelligence gathering enables the 
government to pursue counterintelligence activities—to monitor foreign 
agents working in the United States, to investigate spies, and so on.329  
These purposes are quite different from ordinary criminal cases, as the 
primary goal of FISA surveillance is to gather data, not to deal with crimes.  
This is why the FISA required that the primary purpose for the surveillance 
be intelligence gathering.  The USA PATRIOT Act loosened this 
requirement, which is a troubling development since much surveillance in 
today’s world of terrorism has a dual purpose—it involves both intelligence 
gathering and investigating criminal activity.  The USA PATRIOT Act also 
weakened the wall that existed to prevent intelligence gathering from being 
used as a pretext to gather criminal evidence outside of the stricter ECPA 
regime.  In the old version of FISA, the wall would allow evidence gleaned 
from a bona fide intelligence operation that revealed evidence of criminal 
activity to be used in a criminal prosecution.  But a wall was erected to 
prevent the pretextual use of FISA for criminal investigation purposes. I 
O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (search of employee’s office and files may be 
“reasonable”); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 346–47 (1985) (search of student’s 
purse at school was “reasonable”). 
 328 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949) (citations omitted). 
 329 Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. ___, manuscript 33 (2004). 
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recommend that FISA be returned to its pre–USA PATRIOT Act state.  
The old FISA, and the procedures developed in light of it at the DOJ, 
provide a compromise solution that would allow for the surveillance of 
foreign agents, yet prevent the FISA from being abused for criminal 
investigations.330 
B. A Legislative Charter for the FBI 
Another important component of a regulatory regime for government 
surveillance is a legislative charter for the FBI.  The FBI wields a 
tremendous amount of power and it should be placed under greater control 
by Congress.  Today, the FBI has about 11,000 agents and 16,000 support 
staff; it has 56 field offices, 400 satellite offices, and 40 foreign liaison 
posts.331  Despite its vast size, extensive and expanding responsibilities, and 
profound technological capabilities, the FBI lacks a legislative charter.332 
A charter defining the FBI’s scope and powers as well as requiring 
more regular congressional oversight would go a long way to ensuring 
against the terrible abuses of the FBI’s past.  A detailed proposal for such a 
charter is beyond the scope of this Article.  The bulk of such a charter, 
however, could be composed by codifying existing internal FBI Guidelines 
into law.  The Church Committee recommended a legislative charter to 
govern intelligence gathering activities, but many of the Committee’s 
proposals were put into operation through executive orders and 
guidelines.333  Executive orders and Attorney General Guidelines are the 
“primary source of authority for national security surveillance.”334 
Unfortunately, executive orders and guidelines can all be changed by 
executive fiat, as demonstrated by Ashcroft’s substantial revision to the 
guidelines in 2002.335  Moreover, the Attorney General Guidelines are not 
judicially enforceable.336  The problem with the current system is that it 
 330 Under the old FISA approach, the foreign intelligence exception to a warrant 
applies until the primary purpose of the surveillance ceases to be for foreign intelligence.  
United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 915 (4th Cir. 1980); see also DYCUS ET 
AL., supra note 320, at 655. 
 331 FBI, GENERAL FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, 
http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/faqs/faqsone.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2003). 
 332 See DYCUS ET AL., supra note 320, at 698.  The closest thing to a statutory 
authorization for the FBI is 28 U.S.C. § 533 (2000), which gives the Attorney General the 
authority to appoint officials to detect and prosecute crimes and to conduct investigations of 
the Department of Justice and Department of State.  DYCUS ET AL., supra note 320, at 698. 
 333 See DYCUS ET AL., supra note 320, at 464; Banks & Bowman, supra note 79, at 34–
35.  President Ford responded to the Committee by issuing Executive Order No. 11,905.  
DYCUS ET AL., supra note 320, at 464.  Ford’s order was superseded with President Carter’s 
Executive Order No. 12,036.  Id.  President Reagan replaced Carter’s order with Executive 
Order No. 12,333.  Id. 
 334 Banks & Bowman, supra note 79, at 74. 
 335 See supra notes 297–299 and accompanying text. 
 336 DYCUS ET AL, supra note 320, at 712.  There is one exception.  In Alliance to End 
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relies extensively on self-regulation by the executive branch.  Much of this 
regulation has been effective, but it can too readily be changed in times of 
crisis without debate or discussion.  Codifying the internal executive 
regulations of the FBI would also allow for public input into the process.  
The FBI is a very powerful arm of the executive branch, and if we believe 
in separation of powers, then it is imperative that the legislative branch, not 
the executive alone, become involved in the regulation of the FBI.  The 
guidelines should be judicially enforceable to ensure that they are strictly 
followed. 
I recommend that the original FBI guidelines, under Attorney General 
Levi, should be used as the foundation for a legislative charter for the FBI.  
The Levi Guidelines were crafted to prevent the abuses chronicled by the 
Church Committee, and they provide strong limits on the use of 
surveillance directed at free speech and political activities.337  The threshold 
standards of the Levi Guidelines are more meaningful than the watered-
down versions employed in subsequent revisions.  The Levi threshold 
standards are not insurmountable—they are a practical compromise 
between privacy and effective law enforcement that safeguards against 
abuses. 
Additionally, the charter should require Congress to undertake an 
extensive assessment of intelligence activities at five- to ten-year intervals.  
This assessment would be similar in scope to the Church Committee 
Report.  The Church Committee performed a profoundly valuable service, 
exposing and memorializing surveillance abuses that occurred over a 
period of about forty years.  This kind of thorough accounting of the often 
clandestine activities of governmental intelligence agencies should not be 
an isolated undertaking. 
Conclusion 
Currently, Congress is considering whether certain changes to 
surveillance law made by the USA PATRIOT Act should sunset in 2005.  
Congress should take this opportunity to reconsider electronic surveillance 
law more generally.  Merely rolling back the USA PATRIOT Act changes 
will not address the most serious failings of electronic surveillance law.  
Tweaks and patches will not be sufficient—a more radical reconstruction is 
sorely needed. 
Repression v. City of Chicago, 742 F.2d 1007, 1010 (7th Cir. 1984), the FBI agreed as part 
of a settlement that the Guidelines would be judicially enforceable for the plaintiffs. 
 337 See Banks & Bowman, supra note 79, at 68–69. 
